Abington School District v. Schempp: Ruling and Reasoning

In Abington School District v. Schempp (1963), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a Pennsylvania law requiring daily Bible readings and recitation of the Lord’s Prayer in public schools violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The decision applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment and set a two-part test for measuring government action against the constitutional command of religious neutrality.1Cornell Law School. Abington School District v. Schempp (1963)

What Pennsylvania Law Required

Under 24 P.S. § 15-1516, at least ten verses from the Holy Bible had to be read at the start of every school day, without comment. In the Abington School District, the readings were broadcast through the public address system into homerooms and followed by a recitation of the Lord’s Prayer. The district defended the practice as necessary for the moral development of students.2Pennsylvania General Assembly. 24 P.S. § 15-15161Cornell Law School. Abington School District v. Schempp (1963)

The statute let a parent or guardian excuse a child in writing. The Schempps declined to use that provision, arguing that removing their children from the classroom during the exercise would mark them as outcasts or atheists.3Justia. Schempp v. School District of Abington Township

The Court’s Ruling

Justice Tom C. Clark wrote the majority opinion. The Court found that the mandatory Bible readings and the Lord’s Prayer were religious exercises, whatever secular purposes the district claimed for them. Sponsorship by the state, carried out during compulsory school hours through school facilities, placed government authority behind a religious observance.1Cornell Law School. Abington School District v. Schempp (1963)

To measure the statute against the Establishment Clause, the Court set out a two-part inquiry:4Constitution Annotated. Constitution of the United States – Amdt1.2.4.5.3 School Prayer and Bible Reading

  • The law must have a secular legislative purpose. A statute meant to advance or inhibit religion fails.
  • Its primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion. Even a secular purpose does not save a law whose main result favors a particular faith or religion generally.

The Pennsylvania scheme failed both prongs.1Cornell Law School. Abington School District v. Schempp (1963)

Why the Excusal Provision Did Not Save the Law

The Court rejected the argument that letting students opt out cured the constitutional problem. The Establishment Clause is violated when the state itself sponsors a religious exercise, regardless of whether any individual student is compelled to take part. Voluntariness bears on the separate question of free exercise; it does not answer the establishment question.3Justia. Schempp v. School District of Abington Township

Concurrence and Dissent

Justice William Brennan concurred. He agreed with the outcome and observed that references to religion could still be acceptable in genuinely academic settings.1Cornell Law School. Abington School District v. Schempp (1963)

Justice Potter Stewart dissented. He argued that a properly structured, voluntary religious exercise in a public school would not violate the First Amendment, and he warned that striking these programs down risked hostility toward religion and interference with parents who wanted religious instruction for their children.1Cornell Law School. Abington School District v. Schempp (1963)

What the Decision Did and Did Not Reach

The ruling forbids state-sponsored devotional exercises in public schools. It does not bar the academic study of the Bible or of religion as part of a secular curriculum, a distinction Justice Brennan drew directly and one the majority’s reasoning leaves open by focusing on the religious character of the exercise itself.1Cornell Law School. Abington School District v. Schempp (1963)