Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.: Arbitration and Title VII Rights

In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., decided in 1974, the Supreme Court held that an employee who takes a discrimination grievance through arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement still has the right to sue in federal court under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The arbitrator’s ruling does not bind the federal judge, though it can be admitted as evidence.¹

How the Case Reached the Supreme Court

Harrell Alexander Sr. worked as a drill operator for the Gardner-Denver Company until his discharge in 1969. The company said he was fired for failing to meet production standards and producing excessive scrap metal. Alexander said the real reason was racial discrimination.

He filed a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement between Gardner-Denver and the United Steelworkers of America. The grievance moved through the internal stages and ended in arbitration. The arbitrator sided with the company, finding just cause for the firing based on performance. Alexander then sued in federal court under Title VII. The lower courts applied an election-of-remedies theory and barred the suit, treating the arbitration as the end of the matter.¹

Contractual Rights and Statutory Rights Are Separate

The Supreme Court rejected that approach. A collective bargaining agreement creates contractual rights that the union administers on behalf of the workforce. Title VII creates statutory rights that belong to the individual employee and protect against discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.² Those statutory rights cannot be waived through the collective bargaining process, and a union cannot trade them away when it negotiates a contract.

An arbitrator’s job is to read and apply the contract, not to enforce federal anti-discrimination law. A ruling on whether the firing violated the contract answers a different question from whether it violated Title VII. The two forums coexist because they do different work.¹

Trial De Novo in Federal Court

The Court held that Alexander was entitled to a trial de novo on his Title VII claim. The federal court hears the discrimination claim fresh, without being bound by what the arbitrator concluded. Congress designed Title VII to supplement existing remedies, not to be swallowed by them, and federal courts carry the final responsibility for enforcing the statute after the required administrative steps.¹

The Court also pointed to structural reasons for not treating arbitration as the final word on a statutory claim. Arbitrators are chosen for their knowledge of the shop and the contract, not for their expertise in federal civil rights law. Arbitral procedure typically offers narrower discovery, relaxed evidentiary rules, different mechanisms for compelling testimony, and a thinner public record than a federal trial. Those features suit the resolution of contract disputes but leave gaps when statutory rights are at stake.¹

How Judges Weigh a Prior Arbitration Decision

The arbitrator’s decision is not ignored. It can be admitted into evidence, and the district judge decides how much weight it deserves. The Court identified factors relevant to that weighing:¹

The procedural fairness of the arbitration
The adequacy of the record built there
The arbitrator’s competence on the specific issues
The degree to which statutory rights were actually considered
Whether the contract’s provisions align with federal law

An award that squarely engaged with the employee’s Title VII rights may receive more weight. A judge is never required to defer to the arbitrator’s conclusion on the discrimination question itself. The court keeps its independent authority to decide the statutory claim on the evidence before it.¹

1
Legal Information Institute. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
2
Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2