In American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a 1984 Indianapolis ordinance that defined pornography as sex discrimination, holding that the law engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the ruling through a summary disposition, leaving the appellate judgment in place.1Justia. American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut
What the Indianapolis Ordinance Did
Indianapolis took a different approach from traditional obscenity laws. Rather than relying on moral grounds, the city treated pornography as a civil rights problem. The ordinance defined pornography as the graphic and sexually explicit subordination of women through pictures or words, covering portrayals such as women shown experiencing pleasure through pain or presented as sexual objects.1Justia. American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut
People who believed they had been harmed could file complaints and pursue civil remedies, and the law also allowed suits for damages against producers or sellers of materials that influenced someone to injure the plaintiff.1Justia. American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut
Why the Court Found Viewpoint Discrimination
Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Frank Easterbrook explained that the government generally cannot restrict expression because of the ideas it conveys. The ordinance failed that principle on its face. Speech depicting women in positions of equality was permitted; speech depicting women in positions of subordination was penalized. That distinction turned on the message, not the manner of expression.1Justia. American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut
The court acknowledged the city’s argument that the depictions caused real harm to women. But under settled First Amendment doctrine, the answer to speech thought to be harmful is generally more speech, not government suppression based on the state’s view of which ideas are acceptable.2Legal Information Institute. Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley
Why the Obscenity Exception Did Not Apply
Obscene material falls outside First Amendment protection, but only when it meets the three-part test from Miller v. California: the work must appeal to the prurient interest, describe sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.3Legal Information Institute. Miller v. California
The Indianapolis definition did none of this. It said nothing about prurient appeal, patent offensiveness, or serious value, so it reached expression that remained fully protected. The court observed that the ordinance’s sweep was broad enough to cover works ranging from Homer’s Iliad to radical feminist writing, so long as the material depicted the subordination the city had defined.1Justia. American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut
What the Supreme Court’s Summary Affirmance Means
After the Seventh Circuit ruled, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment through a summary disposition. A summary affirmance upholds the outcome below, but it does not necessarily endorse the appellate court’s full reasoning as controlling doctrine in every future case.4Justia. Mandel v. Bradley
Even with that qualification, the result is settled. Indianapolis could not enforce its ordinance, and the case stands as a leading authority for the principle that a locality cannot suppress sexually explicit expression on the theory that the message itself subordinates a protected group.