In Bowers v. DeVito, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the United States Constitution is a charter of negative liberties, meaning state officials generally cannot be sued under federal civil rights law for failing to protect a person from violence committed by a private individual. The decision came after Illinois officials released a man with a known history of homicidal violence, who then killed Marguerite Bowers. Her estate sued, and the court held that no federal constitutional right had been violated.1Justia. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616
How the Case Arose
Thomas Vanda had killed a young woman years earlier and was found not guilty by reason of insanity. He was diagnosed with a personality disorder that made him prone to impulsive violence and was held in a state mental health facility. State officials later authorized his discharge despite that history. Roughly a year after his release, Vanda murdered Marguerite Bowers.1Justia. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616
Her estate sued the state defendants responsible for the release, arguing that letting a known dangerous person back into the community caused her death.
The Section 1983 Claim
The estate brought the lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows suits against people acting under state authority who deprive someone of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.2Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 The theory was that officials violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to protect Bowers from a threat they knew about and had control over.1Justia. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616
That framing put a specific question in front of the court: does the Constitution guarantee protection from private criminal acts?
The Holding: Negative Liberties Only
The Seventh Circuit said no. The Constitution, the court explained, prevents the government from acting in certain ways; it does not obligate the government to provide services like law and order. The Due Process Clause bars the state from depriving people of life, liberty, or property without due process, but it does not require the state to shield them from harm caused by others.1Justia. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616
Applied to the facts, the decision to release Vanda might have been negligent under state tort law, but negligence alone is not a federal civil rights violation. Without a deprivation of a constitutional right by the state itself, § 1983 does not reach the conduct.1Justia. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616
When a Duty to Protect Does Exist
The court recognized narrow situations in which the state does owe a constitutional duty of care. These generally arise when the state has restrained a person’s liberty so that the person cannot care for themselves:3Legal Information Institute. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189
- People incarcerated in prison.
- People involuntarily committed to a mental health facility.
- Others taken into physical custody against their will.
A separate exception, the state-created danger doctrine, applies when the government actively puts someone in a position of danger they would not otherwise face. The court used the image of throwing someone into a snake pit to describe the kind of affirmative act that triggers liability.1Justia. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616
What Remedies Remain
Closing the federal courthouse door does not close every door. Someone harmed because a government agency failed to protect them may still have claims under state personal injury or negligence law. What Bowers forecloses is the use of § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment to convert that failure into a federal civil rights case, absent custody or a state-created danger.1Justia. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616