The federal cases often grouped under the label of an Iranian spy ring in Washington are not a single conspiracy but a cluster of prosecutions brought over several years against people working, in different ways, for Iranian intelligence in and around the capital. The charges fall into three recognizable patterns: stealing sensitive U.S. government information, plotting to kill named officials and dissidents on American soil, and surveilling members of the Iranian-American opposition. Sentences handed down so far run from roughly two and a half years for surveillance work to a potential life term for a convicted murder-for-hire operative.
Theft of Sensitive Government Information
The clearest recent example of an Iranian intelligence source embedded in the federal workforce is Abouzar Rahmati, a naturalized U.S. citizen who worked as a contractor for the Federal Aviation Administration. From at least December 2017 through June 2024, Rahmati acted under the direction of Iranian intelligence officers. He used his FAA access to download roughly 172 gigabytes of files, including sensitive material on the National Aerospace System, airport surveillance radar, and radio frequency data. He stored the files on removable media and hand-carried them to Iran in April 2022. He also collected information on the U.S. solar energy industry at Iranian direction, routing it through his brother in Iran.1United States Department of Justice. Former FAA Contractor Pleads Guilty to Illegally Acting as an Agent of the Iranian Government
Rahmati pleaded guilty to acting as an agent of a foreign government without notifying the Attorney General and to conspiracy. He faced a statutory maximum of ten years on the agent charge and five years on the conspiracy count.1United States Department of Justice. Former FAA Contractor Pleads Guilty to Illegally Acting as an Agent of the Iranian Government
A much older but more serious case involves Monica Elfriede Witt, a former Air Force intelligence specialist and Office of Special Investigations special agent who left government service in 2008 and defected to Iran in 2013. A federal grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted her in February 2019 for conspiring to deliver, and actually delivering, national defense information to Iran. Prosecutors said she helped Iranian intelligence target her former U.S. Intelligence Community colleagues and disclosed the code name and classified mission of a Department of Defense Special Access Program. The same indictment charged four Iranian nationals with running cyber intrusions against those former colleagues. Witt remains a fugitive and is listed by the FBI as residing in Iran and considered an international flight risk.2United States Department of Justice. Former U.S. Counterintelligence Agent Charged With Espionage on Behalf of Iran3Federal Bureau of Investigation. Monica Elfriede Witt
Plots to Kill U.S. Officials and Dissidents
Several prosecutions involve attempts to carry out killings inside the United States, and these generate the heaviest charges on the docket.
In March 2026, a federal jury convicted Asif Merchant, described by prosecutors as a trained operative of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, of murder-for-hire and attempting an act of terrorism transcending national boundaries. Merchant entered the United States in April 2024 tasked with recruiting people to steal documents, stage a protest, and assassinate one of three specific U.S. government officials and politicians. In June 2024 he met with undercover law enforcement officers he believed were hitmen, and he was arrested the next month before he could leave the country. He had begun working for the IRGC in Pakistan in late 2022 or early 2023, where he was trained in tradecraft and countersurveillance. He faces up to life in prison.4United States Department of Justice. Iranian Intelligence Agent Convicted of Terrorism and Murder for Hire in Connection with Foiled Plot to Assassinate U.S. Politicians and Government Officials
Shahram Poursafi, a uniformed IRGC member assessed to be working for the IRGC Quds Force, was charged with using interstate commerce facilities to commission a murder-for-hire and with providing material support to terrorists. Between October 2021 and April 2022, Poursafi allegedly used encrypted messaging apps to hire people inside the United States to kill a former senior U.S. government official in the Washington, D.C., or Maryland area, offering $300,000 for the job. He remains at large, and the State Department’s Rewards for Justice program is offering up to $20 million for information leading to his arrest or conviction.5Federal Bureau of Investigation. Shahram Poursafi
A separate line of cases involves plots to kill the journalist and activist Masih Alinejad, a prominent critic of the Iranian government living in the United States. Two individuals recruited to carry out the murder were each sentenced to 25 years in prison.6United States Department of Justice. Two Russian Mob Leaders Sentenced to 25 Years in Prison for Murder for Hire Targeting Journalist
Surveillance of the Iranian-American Opposition
Not every Iranian intelligence target in the United States is a government official. A substantial share of the activity federal prosecutors have charged involves watching Iranian-Americans who speak out against the regime, and mapping the networks they belong to.
Ahmadreza Mohammadi Doostdar, a dual U.S.-Iranian citizen, and Majid Ghorbani, an Iranian citizen living in California, were charged with surveilling Iranian-American members of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and attendees at opposition rallies. Doostdar also surveilled Jewish organizations. Both pleaded guilty. Doostdar received just over three years in prison, and Ghorbani received 30 months.7United States Department of Justice. Two Individuals Sentenced in Connection with Work on Behalf of Iran
The FBI treats this kind of activity, which it calls transnational repression, as a priority counterintelligence threat and investigates tactics ranging from stalking and harassment to cyber-hacking, physical assault, attempted kidnapping, and attempted murder. The Philadelphia Field Office houses the Bureau’s first operational task force dedicated to disrupting these threats.8Federal Bureau of Investigation. Transnational Repression
Impersonation of Federal Officers
One Washington-area case defies neat categorization. In April 2022, Arian Taherzadeh and Haider Ali were arrested for impersonating federal law enforcement officers. Using fake identification, the two rented luxury apartments, defrauded property owners of rent, and worked their way into the social circles of actual law enforcement personnel. The scheme bilked victims of more than $750,000. Ali pleaded guilty to conspiracy, bank fraud, and unlawful possession of a large-capacity ammunition feeding device, and was sentenced to 68 months. Taherzadeh pleaded guilty to a federal conspiracy charge, the same weapons offense, and voyeurism, and received 33 months. The convictions were for fraud and impersonation rather than espionage, though the case drew investigative scrutiny over possible foreign intelligence connections.9Department of Justice. Virginia Man Sentenced to Federal Prison for Conspiring To Impersonate Federal Law Enforcement
The Federal Charges Prosecutors Use
Prosecutors pick a statute to match the conduct, and the penalties differ sharply. Four come up repeatedly in the Iran cases.
Acting as an Unregistered Foreign Agent (18 U.S.C. 951)
Section 951 makes it a crime to operate inside the United States subject to the direction or control of a foreign government or official without first notifying the Attorney General. The maximum penalty is a fine, up to ten years in prison, or both. This was the lead charge against Rahmati and against Doostdar and Ghorbani. The statute excludes accredited diplomats, officially acknowledged foreign representatives, and people engaged in legal commercial transactions, though the commercial-transaction exception narrows significantly when the foreign government involved has been designated a national security threat.10Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 18 USC 951 – Agents of Foreign Governments
Foreign Agents Registration Act (22 U.S.C. 611 et seq.)
FARA is a different statute, often confused with Section 951. Section 951 is a criminal notification requirement aimed at clandestine agents; FARA is a public-disclosure regime aimed at people engaged in political activities, public relations, or lobbying for a foreign principal. Its stated purpose is to let the public know who is spreading propaganda or acting in a foreign government’s interests, so statements can be weighed in context. FARA charges typically surface in influence operations rather than classic espionage. In 2021, for instance, the Iranian-American political scientist Kaveh Lotfolah Afrasiabi was charged with failing to register under FARA while allegedly working covertly for the Iranian government and its U.N. mission for over a decade.11Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 22 USC 611 – Foreign Agents Registration Act – Definitions
Material Support to a Foreign Terrorist Organization (18 U.S.C. 2339B)
The IRGC has been designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization since April 2019. Knowingly providing material support or resources to the IRGC carries up to 20 years, and up to life if a death results. This charge was used in the Poursafi assassination-plot case and gives prosecutors far more leverage than an unregistered-agent charge alone.12Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 18 USC 2339B – Providing Material Support or Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations
Espionage and Murder-for-Hire
The heaviest charges appear in cases involving classified information or violence. Witt was charged under the statutes covering delivery of national defense information to a foreign government. Merchant was convicted of murder-for-hire and attempting an act of terrorism transcending national boundaries, with a potential life sentence.
Reporting Suspected Iranian Intelligence Activity
Anyone in the United States who believes they are the target of foreign intelligence activity or transnational repression can report it to the FBI regardless of citizenship or immigration status. Reports go to tips.fbi.gov or 1-800-225-5324. The FBI also publishes a Threat Intimidation Guide, available in multiple languages, that explains how to recognize different forms of transnational repression and what to do if you have been threatened.8Federal Bureau of Investigation. Transnational Repression