Is the Fleeing Felon Rule Still in Effect?

The fleeing felon rule, as it existed at common law, is no longer the law in the United States. The Supreme Court struck it down in 1985 in Tennessee v. Garner. Today, a police officer may use deadly force against a fleeing suspect only when the officer has probable cause to believe that person poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or to others. Flight by itself, even flight from a felony, is not enough.

What the Old Rule Allowed

The common-law fleeing felon rule came from English law and let an officer use deadly force to stop any suspected felon from escaping, whatever the felony was. A burglary suspect running from a backyard carried the same lethal-force justification as a suspect fleeing a violent assault.1Office of Justice Programs. Deadly Force – The Common Law and the Constitution

Most states carried some version of that rule into the 20th century. Tennessee’s statute was typical: it authorized officers to use “all the necessary means to effect the arrest” when a suspect fled after being told to stop. That statute is what the Supreme Court eventually tested against the Fourth Amendment.

How Tennessee v. Garner Ended It

On the night of October 3, 1974, Memphis officers answered a burglary-in-progress call. Officer Elton Hymon found 15-year-old Edward Garner in the backyard trying to climb a chain-link fence. Hymon was “reasonably sure” Garner was unarmed and could see he was young and slight. When Garner kept climbing after being told to stop, Hymon shot him in the back of the head. Garner died at a hospital. Ten dollars and a purse taken from the house were found on his body.2Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)

Garner’s father sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal civil rights statute that allows people to bring suit when a government official violates their constitutional rights. The case reached the Supreme Court in 1985.

Justice Byron White, writing for the Court, held that using deadly force to stop a fleeing suspect is a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment and has to be reasonable. A blanket rule permitting officers to kill any fleeing felony suspect, regardless of actual dangerousness, could not meet that test. “It is not better that all felony suspects die than that they escape,” White wrote. The Tennessee statute was unconstitutional, and the common-law rule it rested on was finished as a national matter.3FLETC. Part III Deadly Force – Tennessee v. Garner

The Standard That Replaced It

Garner set a two-part test. First, deadly force must be necessary to prevent the suspect’s escape. Second, the officer must have probable cause to believe the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or to others. Both parts have to be satisfied.2Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)

The Court offered two concrete examples of when that threshold is met: when the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon, and when the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm. An unarmed teenager climbing a fence after a burglary does not qualify. A robbery suspect who fires at officers during the chase does.

Garner also added a procedural safeguard: where feasible, officers should give a verbal warning before firing. “Feasible” is the operative word. No one expects a warning while an officer is being shot at. But when there is time and a warning would not increase the danger, giving one makes the force more defensible in court.3FLETC. Part III Deadly Force – Tennessee v. Garner The Department of Justice applies a similar rule to its own officers, requiring a verbal command to submit before deadly force whenever doing so would not increase the danger.4United States Department of Justice. 1-16.000 – Department of Justice Policy on Use of Force

How Graham v. Connor Fits In

Four years after Garner, the Court decided Graham v. Connor (1989), which set the framework for evaluating all police uses of force. Every excessive-force claim is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard, judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene at the time, without the benefit of hindsight.5Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. Part I Graham v. Connor Whether the officer personally felt threatened or had good intentions does not control. The Court identified three factors:

  • The severity of the crime at issue
  • Whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of officers or others
  • Whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to flee

The factors work together, and flight on its own does not justify deadly force. A driver bolting from a traffic stop with no weapon and no demonstrated danger stands in a different place than an armed suspect fleeing a shooting scene. Courts look at the totality of the circumstances rather than treating any single factor as a trigger.

Vehicle Pursuits

Car chases make up a large share of fleeing-suspect cases. The Supreme Court addressed them in Scott v. Harris (2007). Officer Timothy Scott rammed Victor Harris’s car to end a high-speed pursuit, and the resulting crash left Harris a quadriplegic. Harris sued, arguing the ramming was unreasonable force.6Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007)

The Court sided with the officer. Unlike Garner, Harris was driving recklessly at high speeds and creating a serious risk of death to other motorists, pedestrians, and the pursuing officers. The Fourth Amendment did not forbid ramming the car to end that danger, even at the cost of serious injury to the driver. The flight itself was the threat.

Read together, Garner and Scott point in the same direction. An unarmed teenager climbing a fence is constitutionally protected from deadly force. A driver turning a public road into a demolition derby is not. The question is always whether this suspect, in this moment, poses a real threat of serious harm.

When an Officer Violates the Standard

Officers who use deadly force outside the Garner standard face both civil and criminal exposure, though the practical hurdles are high.

On the civil side, the usual vehicle is a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the same statute Garner’s father used.7Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 42 U.S. Code 1983 – Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights The family can seek compensatory and punitive damages. The biggest obstacle is qualified immunity, which shields officers from personal liability unless they violated a right that was “clearly established” at the time, meaning a reasonable officer would have known the conduct was unconstitutional.8National Conference of State Legislatures. Qualified Immunity In Plumhoff v. Rickard (2014), officers fired 15 shots into a car to end a high-speed chase, killing both occupants, and the Supreme Court still granted qualified immunity because no prior case had clearly established the force was unconstitutional on those specific facts.9Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014)

On the criminal side, 18 U.S.C. § 242 makes it a federal crime for anyone acting under color of law to willfully deprive a person of their constitutional rights. The penalty is up to one year for the base offense, up to ten years when the violation causes bodily injury or involves a dangerous weapon, and up to life or the death penalty when the victim dies.10Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 18 U.S. Code 242 – Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law Federal prosecutions are rare, because the government has to prove the officer acted willfully. State charges for murder or manslaughter are possible and face similar practical obstacles.

What About Private Citizens

The Garner standard comes from the Fourth Amendment, which restricts government conduct. It does not directly govern private citizens or private security guards. For a private person, the right to use deadly force against someone else is generally limited to self-defense: a reasonable belief in an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, with deadly force necessary to stop it. A shoplifter running out the door does not create that kind of threat. Some states allow merchants to use reasonable force to detain a suspected shoplifter, but those statutes typically bar deadly force to protect property alone. A person running away is almost never posing the imminent threat that self-defense law requires.

State Laws That Go Further

Garner is a constitutional floor, not a ceiling. No state can authorize more force than the decision permits, but states can require less. Some restrict deadly force to a defined list of violent felonies instead of leaving it to case-by-case officer judgment. Some require officers to exhaust reasonable alternatives first, or to get supervisor authorization during a pursuit when circumstances allow. Many large police departments go further still in their own use-of-force policies. The answer to when police can shoot a fleeing suspect therefore depends partly on the state and the department, even though the federal minimum from Garner applies everywhere.