The Israeli Supreme Court is the country’s highest judicial authority, and it does two jobs that most democracies split between separate institutions. It hears final appeals from the lower courts, and it sits as a court of first instance for challenges against the government itself. Based in Jerusalem since 1948, it interprets a body of constitutional law built not from a single written charter but from a series of Basic Laws passed piece by piece by the Knesset, Israel’s parliament. That arrangement puts the court at the center of nearly every major fight over the limits of state power.
Who Sits on the Court
The bench has 15 authorized seats, though vacancies mean the working number shifts. Justices serve until the mandatory retirement age of 70. A President of the Supreme Court leads the institution, assisted by a Deputy President who shares both administrative and judicial duties.
By convention, the presidency goes to the most senior justice on the bench, measured by length of service. The rule is not written into any statute, but every President to date has been the longest-serving justice at the time of appointment. Supporters say the seniority system protects judicial independence by removing any incentive for justices to court politicians in hope of promotion. The Supreme Court has never ruled on whether the convention is legally binding.
How Justices Are Appointed
A nine-member Judicial Selection Committee handles appointments. Its members are three sitting Supreme Court justices (one of whom is the President), two cabinet ministers including the Minister of Justice, two Knesset members, and two representatives of the Israel Bar Association. Appointing a new Supreme Court justice currently requires seven of those nine votes, a supermajority that stops any single faction from forcing a candidate through on its own.
That structure is scheduled to change. A 2025 law, discussed further below, replaces the Bar representatives with political appointees and lowers the threshold for appointments.
Appellate Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court is the final stop for appeals in criminal, civil, and administrative matters. When a District Court hears a case at first instance, the losing side can appeal to the Supreme Court as of right, with no permission required. When a case has already gone through one round of appeal in a District Court after starting in a Magistrates Court, the party has to request leave to appeal, and the court decides whether the legal questions are important enough to take.
Most appeals are heard by panels of three justices. A single justice can handle preliminary matters such as temporary orders or applications for leave to appeal. In cases of exceptional importance, the President or Deputy President can expand the panel to any odd number of justices.
The High Court of Justice
The court’s second role is arguably its more consequential one. Sitting as the High Court of Justice, known in Hebrew as Bagatz, it exercises original jurisdiction over challenges to government action. A petitioner goes straight to the Supreme Court without working through lower courts first. That makes it one of the most accessible routes to judicial intervention against the state found in any democracy.
Bagatz petitions target decisions by government officials, agencies, military commanders, and other public bodies. The usual claim is that an official acted outside their authority, violated a right, or failed to carry out a legal duty. The court can issue injunctions stopping government action, orders compelling officials to act, or declarations that a decision was unlawful. Rulings on these petitions regularly shape national policy, from land-use decisions and military operations to the boundaries of executive power.
Israel’s standing rules for Bagatz are notably broad. Petitioners do not always need to show a direct personal injury. The court has recognized standing based on a general interest in lawful governance, particularly in cases involving government corruption or threats to the rule of law. Public interest groups and individual citizens routinely bring petitions on matters that would be dismissed for lack of standing elsewhere. Non-citizens affected by government decisions can petition as well.
Judicial Review of Legislation
For most of its early history, the court did not claim the power to strike down legislation. That changed in the 1990s during what became known as the Constitutional Revolution. In 1992, the Knesset passed two Basic Laws that for the first time explicitly protected individual rights: Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. Both included a limitation clause setting out the conditions under which the government could restrict a protected right.
The limitation clause in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty provides that rights “shall not be violated except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required.” The four conditions are cumulative. A law restricting a right must satisfy all of them, or it can be struck down.
The case that cemented this framework was United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal Cooperative Village, decided in 1995. The court held that Basic Laws enjoy a higher legal status than ordinary legislation, so an ordinary statute that conflicts with a Basic Law’s protections can be declared void. It was the first time Israeli courts struck down Knesset legislation on constitutional grounds.
The Reasonableness Standard
Alongside its power to invalidate legislation, the court uses a reasonableness standard to police executive decision-making. The doctrine targets the quality of administrative decisions rather than the text of a statute. Under it, the court can void a government decision that is so unreasonable no responsible official, weighing the relevant considerations, could have reached it.
The standard requires officials to take all relevant factors into account and ignore irrelevant ones. It has been applied to ministerial appointments and to major policy shifts. If a minister appoints someone to a sensitive position despite obvious disqualifying factors, or a policy decision ignores its own stated objectives, the court can intervene even without a specific statutory violation. The doctrine reaches individual decision-makers’ discretion, not just whether they had legal authority to act in the first place.
The 2024 Ruling on Basic Laws
In July 2023, the Knesset passed an amendment to Basic Law: The Judiciary that eliminated judicial review of reasonableness for decisions made by the government, the prime minister, and cabinet ministers. The amendment triggered mass protests and a wave of petitions.
On January 1, 2024, all 15 Supreme Court justices sat together to decide the case, Movement for Quality Government v. Knesset. The court struck down the amendment. It was the first time in Israeli history the Supreme Court voided a Basic Law. Twelve of the 15 justices held that the court has jurisdiction to review Basic Laws and may intervene in exceptional, extreme cases where the Knesset has exceeded its constituent authority. Eight justices voted to strike down the specific amendment.
The majority reasoned that the Knesset’s constituent power is not unlimited. Even when legislating in its constitutional capacity, the Knesset cannot deny or fundamentally contradict what the court called the “core character” of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Sweeping elimination of reasonableness review, the majority found, inflicted severe harm on the separation of powers and the rule of law by leaving the most powerful officials in government without effective judicial oversight.
The 2025 Judicial Selection Reform
The broader struggle over the judiciary did not end with the 2024 ruling. On March 27, 2025, the Knesset passed a law restructuring the Judicial Selection Committee. The legislation removes the two Israel Bar Association representatives and replaces them with one appointee chosen by the governing coalition and one chosen by the opposition. The balance shifts from four political appointees out of nine to six out of nine.
The law also lowers the majority needed to appoint a Supreme Court justice from seven votes to five, while requiring at least one member from both the coalition and the opposition to support any appointment. Each side effectively holds a veto. Opposition lawmakers boycotted the final vote, which passed 67 to 1, and petitions challenging the law were filed immediately.
The reform is scheduled to take effect only in the next Knesset, following general elections currently set for late 2026. Until then, the existing committee structure remains in place. The petitions challenging the law’s constitutionality are expected to reach the Supreme Court well before the next elections.