The Johnson v. Glick four-factor test is a framework the Second Circuit set out in 1973 for deciding when a correctional officer’s use of force against a pretrial detainee crosses into a constitutional violation. Judge Henry Friendly wrote the opinion, and for nearly two decades federal courts used its four factors as the dominant test for excessive force claims in detention. Two Supreme Court decisions have since narrowed it sharply, but three of the four factors still shape how courts analyze these cases today.
The Four Factors
Judge Friendly directed courts to weigh four considerations when deciding whether force used against a detainee violated the Constitution:1Justia. Johnson v Glick, 481 F2d 1028 (2d Cir 1973)
- The need for force. Was there a legitimate reason to use any physical force at all? A real security threat or active resistance justifies some response; striking a compliant detainee without provocation does not.
- Proportionality. Even when some force is warranted, the amount used has to bear a reasonable relationship to the threat.
- Extent of injury. The severity of the injuries provides objective evidence of how much force was actually applied, separate from what anyone claims happened.
- Good faith versus malice. Was the force applied in a genuine effort to maintain or restore order, or “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm”?
The opinion accepted that jails sometimes require physical intervention and that “not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights.” The four factors were meant to sort ordinary custodial contact from conduct that “shocks the conscience,” the threshold the Supreme Court had drawn in Rochin v. California for due process violations.
The fourth factor caused the most trouble over time. It asked what was going on inside the officer’s head. An officer could use objectively unreasonable force and still avoid liability if the detainee could not prove specific intent to cause harm. That subjective inquiry became the central battleground in later Supreme Court cases.
The Case Behind the Test
Australia Johnson was a pretrial detainee at the Manhattan House of Detention for Men, awaiting trial on felony charges. He alleged that while he was being checked back into the facility, a correction officer named John Fuller rushed into the holding cell, grabbed him by the collar, and struck him twice on the head with something concealed in his fist.1Justia. Johnson v Glick, 481 F2d 1028 (2d Cir 1973) Johnson said the attack was unprovoked, and that the facility failed to provide timely medical care for his head and neck injuries. He sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal statute that lets people sue government officials for violating their constitutional rights.2Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 42 US Code 1983 – Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights
The district court dismissed the whole complaint. The Second Circuit reversed as to Officer Fuller, holding that the allegations were serious enough to proceed, and used the appeal to lay out the four-factor framework.
Why Due Process, Not the Eighth Amendment
The court analyzed Johnson’s claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth Amendment applies to people convicted of crimes and serving sentences. Johnson had not been convicted of anything. Pretrial detainees retain a presumption of innocence, so they are entitled to at least as much protection as convicted prisoners, not less.3Legal Information Institute. US Constitution Annotated – Fourteenth Amendment
The opinion also drew a line between constitutional claims and ordinary state-law battery. A common-law battery happens at “the least touching of another in anger.” A constitutional claim requires something more: conduct arbitrary and oppressive enough to shock the conscience. That threshold kept every minor scuffle in a jail from becoming a federal case, while leaving room for genuine abuses.
How Graham v. Connor Removed Arrest Claims
Federal courts adopted the Johnson v. Glick test widely through the 1970s and 1980s. The Supreme Court then cut back its reach in Graham v. Connor (1989). The Court held that all excessive force claims arising during an arrest, an investigatory stop, or any other seizure must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard, not under substantive due process.4Justia US Supreme Court Center. Graham v Connor, 490 US 386 (1989)
Graham expressly rejected the Johnson v. Glick four-factor test for that category of cases. The problem was the subjective inquiry into whether force was applied “maliciously and sadistically.” Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer’s intentions do not matter. What matters is whether the actions were objectively reasonable in the circumstances, considering:
- The severity of the crime at issue
- Whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to officers or others
- Whether the suspect was actively resisting or attempting to flee
After Graham, the four-factor test survived only for claims by people already in custody: pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment, and convicted prisoners under the Eighth. It no longer reached anyone during the arrest itself.
How Kingsley v. Hendrickson Replaced the Malice Prong
The test’s remaining domain shrank further in Kingsley v. Hendrickson (2015). The Supreme Court held that a pretrial detainee bringing an excessive force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment only has to show that the force used was objectively unreasonable. There is no need to prove the officer had a subjective intent to punish or harm.5Justia US Supreme Court Center. Kingsley v Hendrickson, 576 US 389 (2015)
That directly displaced Johnson v. Glick’s fourth factor. Under Kingsley, reasonableness is judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, taking account of what the officer knew at the time and the legitimate needs of running a facility. Courts still defer to jail officials on security judgments, but the inquiry no longer turns on what was in the officer’s head.
The practical shift is real. Before Kingsley, an officer who used clearly disproportionate force could escape liability if the detainee could not prove sadistic intent. The objective standard removed that barrier.
What Survives of the Test Today
Between Graham and Kingsley, the Johnson v. Glick test no longer controls any category of excessive force claim the way it once did. Graham took the arrest cases. Kingsley took the subjective intent inquiry for detainees. For convicted prisoners, the Eighth Amendment supplies its own framework under separate precedent.
The first three factors have not gone away. The need for force, the proportionality of the force used, and the extent of injury all remain part of how courts assess whether force was reasonable, even under the objective standard Kingsley put in place. What changed is the fourth factor, not the underlying facts courts look at. Judge Friendly’s opinion also remains the decision that first established the due process framework for pretrial detainee force claims, which the Supreme Court has since built on rather than discarded.
How These Claims Are Brought
Excessive force claims by detainees typically reach federal court through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the same statute Johnson used. Section 1983 allows anyone whose constitutional rights are violated by a state or local official acting in an official capacity to sue for damages or injunctive relief.2Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 42 US Code 1983 – Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights Section 1983 has no built-in statute of limitations. Federal courts borrow the personal injury limitations period from the state where the claim arose, typically one to four years, and the clock generally starts when the plaintiff knows or should know about the injury.
The Main Barriers: PLRA Exhaustion and Qualified Immunity
Two obstacles stand between a detainee’s claim and a courtroom verdict.
The first is the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s exhaustion requirement. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), no lawsuit about prison or jail conditions can proceed until the detainee has fully exhausted the facility’s internal grievance process.6Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 42 USC 1997e – Suits by Prisoners Missing an internal filing deadline can permanently bar the federal lawsuit, even when the underlying claim is strong. The PLRA also blocks recovery for purely mental or emotional injury without a showing of physical harm. In a force case with documented injuries, that limit rarely matters; in cases resting on psychological harm alone, it can decide the outcome.
The second is qualified immunity. Government officials are shielded from personal liability unless the plaintiff can show both that a constitutional violation occurred and that the right was “clearly established” at the time. A right is clearly established when existing precedent puts the illegality of the officer’s actions “beyond debate,” so that any reasonable official would have understood the conduct was unlawful.7Congress.gov. Policing the Police – Qualified Immunity and Considerations for Congress Courts can address either prong first. If the plaintiff loses on either, the officer walks. In practice, even clearly excessive force can go unremedied when no sufficiently similar prior case pinned down the specific contours of the right.