In Jordan v. City of New London, the Second Circuit ruled in 2000 that a police department can lawfully reject applicants whose cognitive test scores are too high. Robert Jordan scored a 33 on the Wonderlic Personnel Test; New London only interviewed candidates who scored between 20 and 27, so his application went no further. The court held that the score cap did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the city had a rational reason for it: high scorers, in the department’s view, were more likely to grow bored and quit, wasting the money spent training them.1AELE. Jordan v. New London
Who Robert Jordan Was and What He Scored
Jordan applied to the New London Police Department in 1996 at age 46. As part of the process, he took the Wonderlic, a 50-question, 12-minute test that measures reasoning, reading comprehension, and arithmetic and is used across many industries to gauge how quickly someone can learn a job.1AELE. Jordan v. New London
He scored 33, roughly the 93rd percentile nationally and well above the publisher’s suggested median of 21 for police patrol officers. On the Wechsler scale, that corresponds to an estimated IQ of about 122. He tested very well. That was the reason he was cut.
The Score Cap and New London’s Reasoning
New London had drawn a narrow window: only applicants scoring between 20 and 27 on the Wonderlic advanced to interviews. Jordan’s 33 landed above the ceiling.1AELE. Jordan v. New London
The city’s justification was retention. Officials believed applicants who scored far above the target range would find patrol work unstimulating and leave the department quickly. Training a new officer is expensive; estimates for recruiting, academy training, and supervised field work run from about $100,000 to as high as $240,000 per hire. Screening out high scorers, the city argued, protected that investment.
Jordan suspected the real motive was his age. He filed a separate administrative complaint with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities. The federal lawsuit that followed, though, was fought on a narrower question: whether the Constitution allows a government employer to reject someone for testing too high.1AELE. Jordan v. New London
The Equal Protection Argument
Jordan sued in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. He argued the score cap violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 4, Section 20 of the Connecticut Constitution, both of which restrict the government from drawing arbitrary distinctions between similarly situated people.1AELE. Jordan v. New London
The theory was direct. The city had built a classification based on cognitive test scores and used it to exclude qualified applicants from public employment. Jordan’s team argued the classification was arbitrary: a high score has no logical link to poor job performance, and using it as a disqualifier penalized a trait that ought to be an asset.
Why Strict Scrutiny Did Not Apply
How closely a court examines a classification depends on who it targets. Race, religion, national origin, and alienage are “suspect classes” that trigger strict scrutiny, the most demanding standard, because those groups share an inherent trait, a history of discrimination, and limited political power.2Legal Information Institute. Suspect Classification
High-scoring test-takers fit none of that. They are not a historically oppressed minority, they are not politically powerless, and cognitive ability is not the kind of immutable characteristic that triggers heightened protection. With no suspect class and no fundamental right in play, the court applied the lowest level of review: the rational basis test.1AELE. Jordan v. New London
How Rational Basis Review Actually Works
Under rational basis review, a policy survives if the government has a legitimate goal and the policy is rationally connected to that goal. The government does not have to prove the policy is wise, well-supported, or even effective. It only has to show the policy is not completely irrational.3Legal Information Institute. Rational Basis Test
Most equal protection challenges fail at this stage. Almost any plausible justification is enough, and courts extend heavy deference to the government. A policy can be misguided or counterproductive and still clear the bar, so long as some conceivable set of facts supports it.
The Ruling
District Court Judge Peter Dorsey granted summary judgment to the city on August 29, 1999. The Second Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion on August 23, 2000.1AELE. Jordan v. New London
The appeals court accepted that reducing turnover and controlling training costs are legitimate government interests. Whether high scorers actually leave patrol work sooner was a factual question the court did not need to resolve; rational basis review does not require the government to be correct. The panel wrote that Jordan “may have been disqualified unwisely but he was not denied equal protection.”1AELE. Jordan v. New London
Because the score cap applied uniformly to every applicant regardless of race, sex, age, or any other protected trait, and because the city offered a plausible justification, both the federal and state constitutional claims failed on the same reasoning.
Why a Title VII Case Would Have Looked Different
Jordan’s suit was an equal protection case, not an employment discrimination case, and that choice shaped the outcome. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars employers from using neutral-looking tests that disproportionately exclude people based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Under that “disparate impact” theory, intent doesn’t matter: if a test screens out a protected group at higher rates, the employer has to show the test is job-related and consistent with business necessity.4U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Employment Tests and Selection Procedures
The Supreme Court set that framework in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971), striking down intelligence tests and diploma requirements that disproportionately excluded Black applicants without any demonstrated tie to job performance. Any test used for hiring, the Court said, “must measure the person for the job, and not the person in the abstract.”5Justia. Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401 U.S. 424 (1971)
Jordan did not bring a Title VII claim. His argument was that high intelligence itself should be treated as a protected category, which is a very different legal theory and one that draws rational basis rather than the tougher disparate impact standard. If evidence had shown that the 20-to-27 score window screened out a particular race or sex at higher rates, the case could have gone the other way.
What the Case Means Now
Jordan never became a New London police officer. He took a position with the Connecticut Department of Corrections.
The Second Circuit’s decision was unpublished, so it carries no precedential weight. Other courts are not bound to follow it, and it does not formally establish a new legal rule. Even so, the ruling drew far more attention than most unpublished opinions and became a reference point in debates about police hiring standards. The Office of Justice Programs described its significance as touching the applicant pool for police departments, assumptions about officer intellect, and employment law for law enforcement agencies more broadly.6Office of Justice Programs. Jordan v. The City of New London, Policing Hiring and IQ
How many departments actually enforce upper score caps is not publicly tracked, and agencies are not required to disclose their scoring criteria. What Jordan’s case established, at least as a matter of constitutional law, is that a municipality can do so without violating the Equal Protection Clause, provided it can point to some rational reason for the cutoff.