Judicial elections are the primary way most state court judges in the United States reach the bench, and states use one of four basic systems to run them: partisan elections with party labels on the ballot, nonpartisan elections without them, merit selection followed by yes-or-no retention votes, and straight appointment by the governor or legislature. About three-quarters of states put judges in front of voters in some form. The rest appoint. Which system you encounter depends not just on your state but on which court is on the ballot, because many states use one method for trial courts and a different one for the state supreme court.
The Four Main Systems
Roughly twenty states use partisan elections for at least some judicial positions. Thirteen states use nonpartisan elections at the state supreme court level, and nineteen use them for at least one type of lower court. More than thirty states have adopted some form of retention election somewhere in their judiciary. The categories overlap. A state might elect trial judges in partisan races, pick appellate judges through merit selection, and hold nonpartisan primaries that feed into partisan general elections. Voters in neighboring counties within the same state sometimes see very different judicial ballots.
Partisan Elections
In a partisan judicial election, candidates run with a party label next to their name, just like candidates for governor or state legislature. They typically go through a party primary and then appear on the general election ballot as the Democratic, Republican, or third-party nominee. Texas, Alabama, and Louisiana use this model for most of their judiciary, including their highest courts.
The argument for party labels is transparency: voters who don’t follow judicial races can use affiliation as a rough signal of judicial philosophy. The argument against is that it exposes the courts to the same waves that drive other elections, so a judge’s fate can turn on national politics rather than courtroom performance.
Nonpartisan Elections
Nonpartisan judicial elections drop party labels from the ballot. Candidates appear by name only, and all registered voters participate regardless of their own party registration. If no candidate wins a majority outright, the top two advance to a runoff.
The intent is to separate judges from party politics. The reality is that party organizations and interest groups still endorse and fund candidates, so the party connection sits one step off the ballot rather than disappearing. Voters in these races tend to have less information to work with, which lowers turnout and raises the influence of organized groups that study the candidates.
Merit Selection and Retention Votes
Merit selection, often called the Missouri Plan after the state that pioneered it in 1940, is a hybrid. A nonpartisan nominating commission reviews applicants and sends a short list of qualified candidates to the governor, who appoints one. The new judge serves an initial term of at least twelve months before facing a retention vote. If retained, the judge serves a full term and then stands for retention again at the end of it.
The nominating commission is the heart of the system. These bodies typically mix lawyers chosen by the state bar, non-lawyers appointed by the governor, and sometimes a sitting judge as chair. The design is meant to screen for legal competence before political considerations enter. Critics say the commission itself can become political, and that the governor’s appointment power keeps partisanship in the mix. Supporters say the result is a better-qualified bench than either pure election or pure appointment produces.
A retention election looks different from any other race on the ballot. The judge runs alone. There is no opponent, no party label, and a single question: should this judge be retained? A majority yes keeps the judge in office. A majority no creates a vacancy at the end of the term, filled through the state’s standard appointment process.
Judges almost never lose retention votes. The rare defeats draw national attention precisely because they are unusual. The low failure rate protects experienced judges from political headwinds, but it also means judges with real performance problems can glide through when voters lack information about their records.
Who Can Run
Every state writes its own qualifications, and the bar rises with the level of court. Nearly all states require candidates to hold a law degree and keep an active license to practice. Most set a minimum number of years in practice, commonly five to ten for appellate courts and somewhat less for trial courts. A few states set the practice threshold as low as four years for general jurisdiction trial courts.
U.S. citizenship and residency within the court’s geographic jurisdiction are standard. Minimum age requirements are less universal than people assume. A handful of states set the floor at 30, but most states have no specific age requirement at all. The residency rule is the one that catches candidates most often, especially in newly drawn judicial districts, because it requires living inside the specific area the court serves at the time of filing.
Candidates file a declaration of candidacy with the secretary of state or a local election authority, usually with a filing fee. Some states calculate the fee as a percentage of the annual judicial salary, which can push it into the thousands of dollars for higher courts. A few states let candidates substitute a nominating petition with a set number of voter signatures.
Campaign Rules Candidates Must Follow
Judicial candidates campaign under ethical rules that would look strange to someone running for city council. The American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted in some form by most states, bars candidates from promising how they would rule on specific issues that might come before them. A candidate can discuss judicial philosophy in broad terms but cannot pledge, for example, to always rule a certain way on gun rights or abortion restrictions.
Courts have drawn and redrawn that line. In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Minnesota’s “announce clause,” which had prohibited judicial candidates from stating their views on disputed legal or political issues, holding that the restriction violated the First Amendment. The narrower prohibition on specific promises about future rulings stayed intact.1Justia. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 The practical result is that candidates today can talk about their legal views more openly than they could a generation ago but still cannot commit to decide cases a particular way.
Personal fundraising is also tightly controlled. In 2015, the Supreme Court upheld a Florida rule barring judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions, finding that states have a compelling interest in preserving public confidence in their courts.2Justia. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433 Most states now require candidates to raise money through a campaign committee rather than asking donors directly. Contribution limits range from a few hundred dollars per donor to several thousand, and some states set no limit at all.
Violations carry real consequences. A state judicial conduct commission can issue public reprimands, and a seated judge who crosses the line during a reelection campaign can face suspension or removal.
When Donors Appear in the Judge’s Courtroom
Judicial elections raise a problem that other elections do not: the people who help fund a campaign may later show up as parties in cases before the winner. The Supreme Court addressed this in 2009. A West Virginia case involved a coal company executive who spent roughly $3 million supporting a judicial candidate, and the newly elected justice then declined to recuse himself from a case directly involving that executive’s company. The Court held that the Constitution’s due process guarantee requires recusal when a contributor’s spending was significant and disproportionate enough to create a serious risk of actual bias.3Justia. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868
That ruling set a constitutional floor and left the specifics to the states. Recusal standards remain weak in many places. Most states allow judges to decide their own recusal motions without independent review, which means the judge whose impartiality is at issue makes the call. Few states address whether independent expenditures by outside groups, as opposed to direct contributions, should trigger recusal at all.
How Much Money Flows Through These Races
Spending on judicial elections has climbed sharply. In the 2023–24 cycle, candidates, interest groups, and political parties spent at least $157 million on state supreme court races alone, roughly 35 percent above any previous cycle. Interest groups accounted for more than half of that total. Two seats, one in Wisconsin and one in Pennsylvania, drew nearly $78 million in combined spending between them.
A large share of the money moves through super PACs and nonprofit organizations that can raise and spend without disclosing their donors. Voters often cannot tell who is paying for the ads they see during a judicial race. Polling consistently shows that large majorities of voters believe campaign contributions influence judicial decisions, and judges have voiced the same concern about perception.
What Voters Learn About Judges Before Voting
Retention votes and nonpartisan races work best when voters have something to go on besides name recognition. Roughly sixteen states, along with the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, operate formal judicial performance evaluation programs authorized by statute or court rule.4IAALS. Judicial Performance Evaluation in the States These programs assess judges on behavioral qualities rather than case outcomes: legal knowledge, impartiality, communication, courtroom demeanor, and whether the judge manages a caseload efficiently and rules promptly.
The data comes from surveys of attorneys who have appeared before the judge, along with input from jurors, court staff, and sometimes litigants. Some programs include peer review by other judges. The results are published in voter guides ahead of retention elections.
Bar associations in many states run their own evaluations of candidates in contested races, rating them as qualified, well-qualified, or not recommended. An unfavorable rating does not keep a candidate off the ballot, but it can make fundraising harder and give opponents something to work with, especially in urban areas where voters face long judicial ballots.
Vacancies and Mandatory Retirement
Not every seat gets filled through an election. When a judge leaves the bench before a term expires through retirement, death, appointment elsewhere, or hitting a mandatory retirement age, the state uses its vacancy process. For state supreme court seats, twenty-nine states use gubernatorial appointment with help from a nominating commission. Seventeen states give the governor unilateral appointment power. A handful use legislative appointment or special elections.5Ballotpedia. How Vacancies Are Filled in State Supreme Courts The appointed judge typically serves until the next general election, at which point they stand for election or face a retention vote.
Thirty-two states plus the District of Columbia impose mandatory retirement ages, with 70 the most common threshold. Some states set it higher, at 72, 75, or, in Vermont’s case, 90. The mechanics differ: some states force retirement on the day a judge hits the age limit, others let the judge finish the current term but bar standing for another, and some tie the retirement age to pension eligibility. Between mandatory retirements, resignations, and the sheer number of judicial seats across fifty states, governors collectively make hundreds of interim judicial appointments each year, shaping the bench well before voters weigh in.