Judicial elections are how most states fill seats on their state and local courts, and they come in four main forms: partisan elections that look like ordinary political races, nonpartisan elections that strip party labels off the ballot, merit selection systems that pair a gubernatorial appointment with a later retention vote, and standalone retention elections that ask voters a simple yes-or-no question about keeping a sitting judge. Federal judges are outside this entire system. They receive lifetime appointments and never face voters.
The practice of electing judges traces to mid-1800s reforms meant to make the judiciary accountable to voters rather than dependent on governors or legislatures. States have taken that idea in very different directions since.
Partisan Judicial Elections
In a partisan judicial election, candidates appear on the ballot with a party label, just as they would in a race for the state legislature. Roughly eight states use this method for their supreme courts, and nine use it for trial courts. Candidates go through a party primary before advancing to the general election.
The appeal is that voters know where a candidate’s political sympathies lie. The criticism is that tying judges to party platforms creates pressure to decide cases in ways that satisfy political supporters rather than follow the law. Several states split the difference, using partisan elections for some court levels and a different method for others.
Nonpartisan Judicial Elections
About 13 states choose their supreme court justices through nonpartisan elections, and 16 use this approach for trial courts. The ballot shows only candidate names, with no party affiliation. The design pushes voters toward evaluating professional qualifications rather than political loyalty.
Under the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which most states have adopted in some form, judicial candidates generally cannot publicly identify themselves as candidates of a political organization, seek party endorsements, or make speeches on behalf of political parties.1American Bar Association. Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 4.1 – Political and Campaign Activities of Judges and Judicial Candidates Candidates in explicitly partisan elections operate under a separate provision that lets them identify with a party and accept party endorsements.2American Bar Association. Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 4.2 – Political and Campaign Activities of Judicial Candidates in Public Elections In nonpartisan systems, candidates often face an initial open field where the top two vote-getters advance to the general election.
The tradeoff is information. Without party labels, voters have less to go on, nonpartisan judicial races tend to draw lower turnout, and the voters who do show up often rely on name recognition or endorsements from bar associations and newspapers.
Merit Selection and the Missouri Plan
Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia use some form of merit selection, commonly called the Missouri Plan, for their highest courts. Instead of running a campaign, candidates go through a nominating commission made up of lawyers and citizens. The commission evaluates applicants on legal ability, character, and professional experience, then sends a short list, typically three names, to the governor, who picks one.
The appointed judge serves an initial period on the bench, usually twelve months, before facing a retention election. That gives voters a say without requiring a competitive campaign. The commission’s composition is staggered so that no single governor can stack it with allies, and the mix of lawyers and non-lawyers is designed to prevent any one interest from dominating the process.
Supporters argue this model produces better-qualified judges by filtering out candidates who are good at campaigning but mediocre at judging. Critics counter that it shifts too much power to an unelected commission and the governor, concentrating influence among legal insiders rather than distributing it to voters.
Retention Elections
About 20 states use retention elections for their supreme court justices, and several more use them for trial courts. A retention election is not a race between candidates. A sitting judge appears on the ballot alone, and voters answer a single question: should this judge stay on the bench for another term?
In most states, a simple majority of yes votes is enough. A handful of states impose supermajority requirements, with one requiring at least 57 percent approval, to ensure broader public confidence. If a judge falls short, the seat becomes vacant at the end of the current term and is filled through gubernatorial appointment or the merit selection process.
Retention elections are the most common follow-up for judges initially appointed through merit selection. They also appear in some states that use contested elections for the initial selection but switch to retention for subsequent terms. The format spares judges from raising money for a head-to-head race just to hold onto a seat they already earned. The flip side is that voters who want a different judge cannot vote for a specific alternative. The only option is to vote no and hope the replacement process produces someone better. In practice, judges overwhelmingly win retention elections absent a high-profile controversy.
How Long Judges Serve Between Elections
Term length determines how often voters get a say, and the range across states is wider than most people expect. For state supreme courts, terms run from 6 to 15 years, with six-year terms being the most common. Three states require their highest-court judges to retire at age 70 rather than serving fixed terms, and one state grants life tenure.
Trial court judges generally serve shorter terms, typically four to fifteen years. About 16 states require a shorter initial term, usually one to three years, before a judge becomes eligible for a full term. That structure is especially common under the merit selection model. A six-year term means more frequent elections and greater responsiveness to voters. A fifteen-year term gives judges more insulation from political pressure but less direct accountability.
Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia enforce a mandatory retirement age for judges, ranging from 70 to 90, with 70 and 75 the most common thresholds. A candidate who would reach the retirement age during the upcoming term typically cannot run.
Campaign Finance and Conduct Rules
Judicial campaigns operate under tighter restrictions than races for legislative or executive office. The core concern is straightforward. A judge who owes their seat to a particular donor or interest group has a harder time convincing the public, and the parties in their courtroom, that they will rule fairly.
What Judicial Candidates Cannot Do
The ABA Model Code restricts political activity more aggressively than anything candidates for other offices face. Judicial candidates cannot act as leaders in political organizations, endorse candidates for other offices, or use court resources in their campaigns. They also cannot make pledges or promises about how they would rule on issues likely to come before the court.1American Bar Association. Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 4.1 – Political and Campaign Activities of Judges and Judicial Candidates
The most distinctive restriction involves fundraising. In Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar (2015), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld state bans on personal solicitation of campaign funds by judicial candidates, holding that states have a compelling interest in preserving public confidence in the judiciary and that prohibiting candidates from directly asking for money is narrowly tailored enough to survive First Amendment scrutiny.3Justia Law. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 US 433 The practical result is that candidates in many states set up a separate campaign committee that handles all fundraising while the candidate never personally asks anyone for a check.
Contribution Limits and Disclosure
Individual contribution limits for judicial campaigns typically range from $1,000 to $5,000 per election cycle, depending on the state and the level of court. Some states set different caps at different court levels. A supreme court race might allow larger individual contributions than a local trial court seat. Organizations and political action committees face their own limits and disclosure requirements.
All contributions and expenditures must be reported in periodic filings with the state ethics commission or election authority. Violating campaign finance rules can result in fines, professional disciplinary action, or in the most serious cases, removal from office or disbarment.
Outside Spending
The biggest shift in judicial elections over the past decade has been the growth of independent spending by outside groups. In the 2023–24 cycle, interest groups spent roughly $85 million on state supreme court races, surpassing the approximately $70 million spent by the candidates themselves. That was the first time outside spending exceeded candidate spending in judicial elections. Since 2010, interest group spending has grown from less than 20 percent of total money in these races to more than half.
Independent expenditures are legal as long as they are not coordinated with the candidate’s campaign. But the line between independent and coordinated is blurry in practice, and the sheer volume of outside money raises the same impartiality concerns that contribution limits were designed to address. Several states have adopted stricter coordination rules, including rebuttable presumptions that spending is coordinated when outside groups share consultants or strategic information with candidates.
When a Campaign Donor Appears in Court
Elected judges inevitably hear cases involving people who contributed to their campaigns. The legal question is when that financial connection becomes serious enough to require recusal.
The U.S. Supreme Court drew that line in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. (2009). A coal company executive spent $3 million supporting a judicial candidate’s election, more than all other supporters combined and three times what the candidate’s own committee spent. When the newly elected judge heard a case involving the executive’s company and ruled in its favor, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause required the judge to step aside.4Justia Law. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 US 868
The standard is objective. The question is not whether the judge was actually biased, but whether the campaign support was so significant and disproportionate that a reasonable person would doubt the judge’s neutrality. The factors that matter include the contribution’s size relative to total campaign spending, the total amount spent in the election, and the apparent effect on the outcome. The Court emphasized that this standard targets extreme cases. Routine campaign contributions do not trigger constitutional recusal obligations.4Justia Law. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 US 868
Several states have since adopted specific dollar thresholds rather than relying solely on the case-by-case approach. These rules typically require recusal when a party or their attorney contributed more than a set amount, ranging from roughly $1,000 to $2,500 depending on the state and court level, to the judge’s most recent campaign. For litigants, that means checking a judge’s campaign finance records before trial is more than idle curiosity. It can be the basis for a recusal motion that changes who decides the case.
How Voters Evaluate Judicial Candidates
Unlike legislative races where candidates can be compared on policy positions, judicial elections ask voters to assess professional competence, something most people have no direct way to observe. Two resources help bridge that gap.
Judicial Performance Evaluations
Sixteen states, plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, operate formal judicial performance evaluation programs authorized by statute or court rule. These programs are most common in states that use retention elections, where voters need information about the sitting judge’s track record rather than a comparison between two candidates.
Evaluation commissions typically assess judges on five core criteria: legal knowledge, impartiality, clarity of written and oral communication, judicial temperament (patience, courtesy, and the ability to maintain control of a courtroom), and administrative capacity (punctuality, preparation, and efficient calendar management). Some states add a sixth factor for community involvement. The commissions gather data from attorneys who appeared before the judge, jurors, court staff, and litigants, then publish recommendations before the election.
Bar Association Ratings
State and local bar associations also publish candidate ratings. The ABA recommends evaluating judicial candidates on eight factors: integrity, legal knowledge, professional experience, judicial temperament, diligence, health, financial responsibility, and public service. These ratings carry no legal weight, but they are often the most accessible resource for voters trying to evaluate candidates they have never heard of.
Most voters in judicial elections are working with very little information. Contested races with significant outside spending attract more attention, but the vast majority of judicial elections fly under the radar, and retention elections are especially lopsided. For voters who want to make informed choices, seeking out bar association ratings and performance evaluation reports before heading to the polls is the single most useful step available.