The landmark administrative law cases that define federal agency power fall into a handful of clusters: how much weight courts give agency interpretations of statutes and regulations, when agencies can adjudicate disputes in-house, how their structure and funding withstand constitutional attack, and what process the government owes before it acts on individuals. The anchor decisions include Chevron and its 2024 overruling in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, Kisor v. Wilkie, West Virginia v. EPA, SEC v. Jarkesy, Lucia v. SEC, Axon Enterprise v. FTC, Corner Post v. Board of Governors, CFPB v. Community Financial Services Association, FCC v. Consumers’ Research, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm, Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, Goldberg v. Kelly, and Mathews v. Eldridge. Together, they set the ground rules that every federal regulation, enforcement action, and benefits decision now runs through.
Deference to Agency Reading of a Statute
For forty years, the dominant rule came from Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984). Under Chevron, a court first asked whether Congress had “directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” If the statute was clear, that ended the inquiry. If the statute was “silent or ambiguous,” the court had to defer to the agency’s interpretation as long as it was a “permissible construction of the statute,” even if the court would have read the law differently.1Justia. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. ___ (2024) The theory was that statutory ambiguity amounted to an implicit delegation to the agency Congress had put in charge.
Chevron became the default in thousands of cases spanning environmental, tax, telecommunications, and labor law. But the doctrine proved “difficult to apply consistently,” and the Court itself narrowed it over the years.2Oyez. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo
On June 28, 2024, the Court overruled Chevron in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. The case involved a National Marine Fisheries Service rule requiring Atlantic herring fishermen to pay for federally mandated at-sea monitors when government funding ran out. In a 6-2 decision by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held that Chevron was irreconcilable with the Administrative Procedure Act, which requires courts to exercise “independent judgment” in deciding “all relevant questions of law.” The idea that ambiguity equals delegation was rejected as a “fiction.”3Supreme Court of the United States. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. ___ (2024) Justices Thomas and Gorsuch filed concurrences; Justice Kagan dissented, joined by Justice Sotomayor and, in part, Justice Jackson.
Overruling Chevron did not automatically invalidate every prior decision that had relied on it. Those specific holdings remain subject to statutory stare decisis and must be reopened case by case.1Justia. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. ___ (2024)
What remains is the older, weaker standard from Skidmore v. Swift & Co. (1944). Under Skidmore, agency rulings and interpretations lack the “power to control” judicial decisions but carry the “power to persuade.” Courts may weigh the thoroughness of the agency’s reasoning, its consistency over time, and its specialized experience, but no court is required to accept the agency’s view.4Supreme Court of the United States. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) The Loper Bright majority referenced Skidmore repeatedly, signaling that the older standard remains good law.5National Agricultural Law Center. Who Gets to Say? Agency Deference in a Post-Chevron World
Deference to an Agency’s Reading of Its Own Regulations
A separate doctrine governs how courts treat an agency’s interpretation of its own rules. Under Auer v. Robbins (1997) and its predecessor Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. (1945), courts deferred to an agency’s reasonable reading of its own ambiguous regulations.
In Kisor v. Wilkie (2019), the Court declined to overrule Auer but tightened it substantially. Writing for a divided Court, Justice Kagan held that Auer deference is not “reflexive.” A court must first exhaust the traditional tools of construction — text, structure, history, and purpose — to determine whether the regulation is “genuinely ambiguous.” Even then, the agency’s interpretation must be reasonable, must reflect the agency’s official position rather than an ad hoc litigation stance, must implicate its substantive expertise, and must be a “fair and considered judgment” rather than a convenient post-hoc rationalization.6Supreme Court of the United States. Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. ___ (2019) Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas and partly by Justices Alito and Kavanaugh, would have overruled Auer entirely, calling the majority approach a “stay of execution.”7SCOTUSblog. Opinion Analysis: Justices Leave Agency Deference Doctrine in Place
The Major Questions Doctrine
Even before Chevron fell, the Court carved out an exception for agency actions of extraordinary scope. Under the major questions doctrine, when an agency claims authority over a matter of “vast economic and political significance,” it must point to “clear congressional authorization” rather than rely on vague or ancillary statutory language.8Supreme Court of the United States. West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. ___ (2022)
The doctrine traces to FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. (2000), which rejected the FDA’s attempt to regulate tobacco under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Congress, the Court reasoned, was unlikely to have delegated “a policy decision of such economic and political magnitude to an administrative agency” through vague statutory language, particularly when it had built a separate regulatory scheme for tobacco.9Justia. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)
The doctrine was named in West Virginia v. EPA (2022), which struck down the EPA’s Clean Power Plan. The EPA had read Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act to authorize “generation shifting” away from coal as the “best system of emission reduction.” The Court found the statutory term “system” too vague to authorize a policy that would have imposed billions in compliance costs, retired dozens of coal plants, and restructured how Americans receive electricity.8Supreme Court of the United States. West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. ___ (2022)
Agency Adjudication and the Right to a Jury
A separate line of cases has tested the constitutional foundations of in-house agency enforcement. In SEC v. Jarkesy, decided June 27, 2024, the Court held 6-3 that when the SEC seeks civil penalties for securities fraud, the defendant has a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.10SCOTUSblog. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy
The SEC had charged George Jarkesy, Jr., and his firm Patriot28, LLC with securities fraud and tried the case before an in-house administrative law judge, who imposed a $300,000 civil penalty. The Fifth Circuit vacated the order, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the SEC’s antifraud provisions “replicate common law fraud,” making the claims “legal in nature.” Because civil penalties punish and deter rather than restore, they are the type of remedy historically reserved for courts of law. The Court rejected the argument that the “public rights” exception let Congress route such claims to administrative tribunals, holding that securities fraud actions involve “private rather than public right.”11Supreme Court of the United States. SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. ___ (2024)
The practical effect reaches beyond the SEC. Federal agencies that impose monetary penalties in-house for claims analogous to common law causes of action now face the prospect that defendants can demand jury trials in federal court.
Who Can Appoint an ALJ, and When Can You Challenge the Structure?
The constitutional status of administrative law judges came before the Court in Lucia v. SEC (2018). By 7-2, the Court held that SEC ALJs are “Officers of the United States” subject to the Appointments Clause, meaning they must be appointed by the President, a court of law, or a department head — not by agency staff. Applying Freytag v. Commissioner (1991), the Court found that SEC ALJs exercise “significant discretion” by taking testimony, running trials, ruling on evidence, and enforcing discovery orders.12Supreme Court of the United States. Lucia v. SEC, 585 U.S. ___ (2018)
Whether ALJs’ statutory removal protections themselves violate the Constitution was raised in the Jarkesy litigation at the Fifth Circuit but was not the basis for the Supreme Court’s decision there.13American Bar Association. ALJ Independence
Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC (2023) answered a related procedural question: can parties facing agency enforcement raise structural constitutional challenges in federal court without first completing the agency’s own proceedings? The Court unanimously said yes, applying the three-factor test from Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich (1994). Justice Kagan reasoned that forcing a party to endure an allegedly unconstitutional proceeding and then seek appellate review afterward would come “too late to be meaningful,” because the injury is being subjected to an illegitimate tribunal at all. The constitutional claims were “wholly collateral” to the merits and fell “outside the agencies’ expertise.”14Supreme Court of the United States. Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC, 598 U.S. ___ (2023)
When the Clock Starts on Challenges to a Rule
In Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2024), the Court changed when the six-year APA statute of limitations begins to run. The prevailing view had been that the clock started when the agency finalized a regulation, meaning that after six years no one could bring a facial challenge, regardless of when they were first injured.
In a 6-3 decision by Justice Barrett, the Court rejected that reading. An APA claim does not “accrue” until the plaintiff suffers an injury caused by the final agency action. Newly injured parties can therefore challenge decades-old regulations, so long as their injury occurred within the preceding six years.15California Law Review. Time Bars for Administrative Claims Corner Post itself was a convenience store that incorporated in 2017 and began operations in 2018; it was allowed to challenge a Federal Reserve regulation finalized in 2011.16American Constitution Society. Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Justice Jackson dissented, arguing the ruling effectively eliminates any statute of limitations for facial challenges, since a newly injured party can always appear. Scholars have noted the ruling exposes both substantive and procedural claims — including notice-and-comment defects — to indefinite relitigation.15California Law Review. Time Bars for Administrative Claims
Agency Funding and the Appropriations Clause
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s funding mechanism, which allows it to draw money directly from the Federal Reserve’s earnings rather than through annual congressional appropriations, survived in CFPB v. Community Financial Services Association of America (2024). The Fifth Circuit had struck it down as an Appropriations Clause violation. The Supreme Court reversed 7-2 in an opinion by Justice Thomas.17SCOTUSblog. CFPB v. Community Financial Services Association of America
The Court defined an appropriation as a law authorizing expenditure from a specified source for designated purposes. Because Dodd-Frank identified a specific source (Federal Reserve earnings), a specific purpose (paying the Bureau’s expenses), and a cap (12% of the Federal Reserve System’s 2009 operating expenses, adjusted for inflation), the statute met the constitutional requirement. The majority drew on historical practice, noting that the First Congress funded agencies such as the Customs Service and the Post Office through open-ended fee-based mechanisms.18Supreme Court of the United States. CFPB v. Community Financial Services Ass’n, 601 U.S. ___ (2024) Justice Alito, joined by Justice Gorsuch, dissented, arguing the combination of self-determined funding, indefinite duration, and vast enforcement authority was without historical parallel.
Nondelegation
The nondelegation doctrine holds that Congress cannot transfer its legislative power to the executive branch. Under the standard from the 1930s, delegation is permitted so long as Congress supplies an “intelligible principle” to guide the agency. The Court has not struck down a statute on nondelegation grounds since 1935.
In FCC v. Consumers’ Research, decided June 27, 2025, the Court rejected a nondelegation challenge to the FCC’s Universal Service Fund by a 6-3 vote. Justice Kagan’s majority opinion held that Congress had provided an intelligible principle by directing the FCC to collect funds “sufficient” to support universal service programs. The Court declined to impose a stricter standard for revenue-raising statutes, warning that such a rule “would throw a host of federal statutes into doubt.”19Supreme Court of the United States. FCC v. Consumers’ Research, No. 24-354 (2025) The Court likewise dismissed a “private nondelegation” challenge, finding the FCC retained final authority over calculations performed by the Universal Service Administrative Company.
Justice Gorsuch dissented, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, arguing the delegation was an unconstitutional transfer of the taxing power and urging the Court to move past the intelligible principle test.20SCOTUSblog. Justices Pass on Opportunity to Further Limit the Power of Federal Agencies The intelligible principle standard remains intact for now.
Arbitrary and Capricious Review
The Administrative Procedure Act, enacted in 1946, provides the general framework for how courts review agency actions. Under APA Section 706, courts must “hold unlawful and set aside” agency actions that are arbitrary and capricious, unconstitutional, in excess of statutory authority, or unsupported by substantial evidence in on-the-record cases.21ACUS. Judicial Review – Information Interchange Bulletin Two decisions define how the standard operates.
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe (1971) held that the “arbitrary and capricious” standard requires a “substantial inquiry,” a “thorough, probing, in-depth review” of whether the agency acted within its authority and considered the relevant factors. At the same time, “the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one,” and courts may not substitute their judgment for the agency’s. Overton Park also established that judicial review must rest on the administrative record before the decision-maker, not on after-the-fact justifications prepared for litigation.22Justia. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1983) applied that standard to the rescission of a regulation. An agency rescinding a rule, the Court held, carries the same burden of reasoned explanation as one issuing a rule, and must “examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” The NHTSA’s decision to abandon a passive restraint requirement fell short because the agency failed to consider requiring airbags as an alternative and too quickly dismissed the safety benefits of automatic seatbelts.23Cornell Law Institute. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983)
Ripeness for Pre-Enforcement Challenges
Before a court will review agency action, the dispute must be ripe. The modern framework comes from Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner (1967), which applies a two-factor test. The court asks first whether the issues are “fit” for judicial decision, which purely legal questions about a finalized rule generally are. Second, it asks whether withholding review would cause “hardship” to the challenging party, particularly where the regulation forces an immediate change in behavior under threat of penalties like seizure of goods, heavy fines, or criminal liability.24Library of Congress. Ripeness – Administrative Law When both factors are met, a regulated party can bring a pre-enforcement challenge without waiting to be prosecuted.
Due Process in Benefits and Entitlements
Administrative law also determines what process the government owes an individual before depriving them of benefits or other protected interests. Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) held that welfare benefits are “statutory entitlements” rather than mere privileges, and that due process requires an evidentiary hearing before the government terminates them. By 5-3, the Court ruled that recipients must receive timely notice of the reasons for termination, an opportunity to present evidence and argue orally, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and an impartial decision-maker who states the reasons for the determination.25Justia. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) then set the general framework courts still use to decide how much process is due. The three-factor balancing test weighs the private interest affected by the government’s action, the risk of erroneous deprivation through existing procedures and the probable value of additional safeguards, and the government’s interest in efficiency and fiscal conservation. Applying it, the Court held that Social Security disability benefits could be terminated before a hearing, because disability determinations rest on “routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports” that reduce the risk of error, and any wrongly denied recipient can be made whole through retroactive payments.26Justia. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) The Mathews test now governs due process questions far beyond benefits, including government employment and property seizures.27Cornell Law Institute. Due Process Test in Mathews v. Eldridge
Read together, these cases show a field in motion. The interpretive posture of federal courts has shifted decisively away from deference; the door to structural and constitutional attacks on agency adjudication is wider than it has been in a generation; the timing window for challenging rules has expanded; and the older procedural doctrines from Overton Park, Abbott Labs, Goldberg, and Mathews still supply the everyday grammar for judicial review. Any encounter with a federal agency, whether as a regulated business, a benefits claimant, or an enforcement target, runs through some combination of these decisions.