An Australian-listed miner, Energy Transition Minerals Ltd. (formerly Greenland Minerals), is pursuing an $11.5 billion claim against the governments of Greenland and Denmark over the collapse of its Kvanefjeld rare earth project in southern Greenland. The Greenland mining lawsuit is one of the largest investor-state arbitration cases ever tied to an environmental law: a 2021 statute banning uranium mining that made the deposit legally unmineable. In November 2025, the arbitration tribunal ruled largely for Greenland, sending the central legal question to Greenland’s own courts and dismissing all claims against Denmark.
The Kvanefjeld Deposit and What Was at Stake
The Kvanefjeld deposit, known in Greenlandic as Kuannersuit, sits near the towns of Narsaq and Qaqortoq in southern Greenland. It holds one of the world’s largest known concentrations of rare earth elements, including the “magnet metals” neodymium, praseodymium, terbium, and dysprosium used in wind turbines, electric vehicles, and defense hardware. It also contains zinc, fluorspar, and uranium at roughly 360 parts per million.
Energy Transition Minerals, then trading as Greenland Minerals and Energy, began work on the project in 2007 under an exploration license. The company estimated over one billion tonnes of mineral resources, a 37-year mine life, and $22.8 billion in tax revenue to Greenland over the life of the mine. By April 2020, the Greenland government confirmed the company had met the requirements under the Mineral Resources Act to be entitled to an exploitation license, pending environmental and social impact assessments and community consultation.1Innovation News Network. The Kvanefjeld Project: Potential World-Class Supplier of Rare Earths
The project also carried heavy Chinese backing. In 2016, Shanghai-listed Shenghe Resources, majority state-owned, acquired a 12.5 percent stake and became the largest shareholder.2China Observers in Central Europe. De-Risking Rare Earths: The Greenland Stalemate and the Critical Raw Materials Act Shenghe later signed a 2018 memorandum to lead processing and marketing of the rare earths and, by 2019, formed a joint venture with China National Nuclear Corporation to handle the uranium and thorium byproducts.3DIIS. Chinese Investments in Greenland
The 2021 Election and the Uranium Ban
Kvanefjeld dominated Greenland’s April 2021 parliamentary election, widely called the “mining election.”4CSIS. Greenland Rare Earths and Arctic Security Polls showed 71 percent of southern Greenlanders opposed the mine, citing radioactive waste, contamination risk, and the scale of foreign involvement in a small agriculture-dependent region.5European Journal of International Law. Transition Minerals: A Cautionary Tale From Greenland The left-wing Inuit Ataqatigiit party, which had campaigned explicitly against the project, won. Prime Minister Muté B. Egede, a longtime critic of the mine, declared: “We have something that money can’t buy. We will do everything we can to stop the Kvanefjeld project.”3DIIS. Chinese Investments in Greenland
On November 9, 2021, the Greenland Parliament passed a law banning the prospecting, exploration, and exploitation of uranium, prohibiting the mining of any deposit above 100 parts per million.6Reuters. Greenland Bans Uranium Mining, Halting Rare Earths Project At roughly 360 parts per million, Kvanefjeld sat well above the threshold. The company tried to salvage the project in December 2022 by filing an amended application that excluded uranium extraction; the government rejected it in September 2023.1Innovation News Network. The Kvanefjeld Project: Potential World-Class Supplier of Rare Earths
The $11.5 Billion Claim
In March 2022, the company’s Greenlandic subsidiary filed for arbitration against Greenland, naming Denmark as a second respondent. The case was seated in Copenhagen under the Danish Arbitration Act.7Jus Mundi. Greenland Minerals v. Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark – Request for Arbitration
The company’s case rests on two arguments. The first is that its 2007 exploration license, read with Section 29 of Greenland’s Mineral Resources Act, gave it an automatic right to an exploitation license once it demonstrated a viable deposit and complied with license terms. The exploration license states that if the licensee “has found and delineated commercially viable deposits” and complied with the license, it “is entitled to be granted an exploitation licence.” The company’s legal expert, Professor Bent Ole Gram Mortensen, asserted this right had crystallized into an “unconditional right” by December 1, 2021.8Jus Mundi. Greenland Minerals v. Government of Greenland – Press Release on Filing of Statement of Claim The second is that the uranium ban and license refusal amount to expropriation.9The Guardian. Greenland Mining and Investor-State Dispute Settlement
An independent valuation commissioned by the company put the project’s value at $7.5 billion. With $4 billion in pre-award interest, the total reached $11.5 billion, roughly four times Greenland’s 2023 GDP.5European Journal of International Law. Transition Minerals: A Cautionary Tale From Greenland4CSIS. Greenland Rare Earths and Arctic Security
The Greenland government countered that exploration and exploitation licensing are distinct procedures and that holding one does not entitle the holder to the other. In its June 2023 denial, the Ministry of Mineral Resources cited multiple license amendments between 2012 and 2023 that explicitly stated the company “was not entitled to be granted a license to exploit radioactive elements.”10American Bar Association. Testing Greenland’s Legal Autonomy to Regulate Minerals It also pointed to a 2011 addendum giving the government “unlimited discretion” to reject applications, though the company’s legal experts called that addendum “invalid and unenforceable under Danish law.”8Jus Mundi. Greenland Minerals v. Government of Greenland – Press Release on Filing of Statement of Claim
The November 2025 Ruling
After an oral hearing on jurisdiction in Copenhagen on June 25, 2025, the tribunal issued its jurisdictional decision on October 28, 2025, and its full ruling on November 17, 2025. The result went substantially in Greenland’s favor.11Conflict Resolution International. Greenland Arbitration Panel Rules for Government in Environmental Dispute12Transnational Dispute Management. Energy Transition Minerals Ltd and Greenland Minerals – Arbitration Details
The tribunal reached three conclusions. It found that whether Greenland Minerals had a right to an exploitation license was “not arbitrable” and must be resolved in Greenland’s courts.13Poul Schmith. Arbitration Tribunal Rules in Favour of the Government of Greenland in Billion Dollar Claim It dismissed all claims against Denmark, holding that Greenland has the legal power to enter mining agreements independently.14Global Arbitration Review. Panel Halts Claims Against Greenland and Denmark Over Uranium Ban On the $11.5 billion damages claim, it declined to rule at this stage, leaving open the possibility of revisiting the question if the Greenlandic courts later side with the company.
Unless Greenland’s courts rule for the company, the arbitration is effectively finished. A costs ruling from the jurisdictional phase was issued on March 9, 2026.15Jus Mundi. Greenland Minerals v. Government of Greenland – Press Release on Tribunal’s Decision on Jurisdiction
Where the Fight Goes Next
With the arbitration stalled, the dispute has moved to the courts. In May 2024, the company filed a case in the Greenland High Court challenging the 2023 license denial, a step required under Greenlandic law within one year of the decision. That case was stayed pending the arbitration’s jurisdictional decision. After the October 2025 ruling, the High Court was expected to set a timetable.16ASX Announcements. Energy Transition Minerals – ASX Announcement
A parallel action filed in Copenhagen City Court was dismissed on November 13, 2025, on the ground that Greenland’s self-government “cannot be sued at the city court.” The company said it viewed the routing to Greenland’s own courts favorably and considered its “case has been strengthened.”17No2NuclearPower. Greenland Mining Update
The government has signaled it intends to go further, declining to renew the company’s exploration license for Kvanefjeld altogether.18Northern Miner. Greenland to Block ETM Kvanefjeld Rare Earth Project The company reported in April 2026 that it continues geological mapping and rock sampling under its existing exploration license.19WISE Uranium Project. Uranium Mining in Greenland
Why the Case Matters Beyond the Parties
Kvanefjeld illustrates a tension surfacing wherever mining meets shifting politics: a democratically elected government reverses course on a project a foreign investor has spent years and significant capital advancing. The company frames the reversal as expropriation of established rights without compensation. The government frames it as legitimate regulation, enacted by a parliament responding to broad public opposition to the environmental risks of uranium mining.
The stakes are large in both directions. Environmental groups and legal scholars have pointed to the case as an example of investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms being used to challenge environmental legislation, with an $11.5 billion demand hanging over a territory with a GDP of roughly $3 billion.9The Guardian. Greenland Mining and Investor-State Dispute Settlement4CSIS. Greenland Rare Earths and Arctic Security20IEEE Spectrum. Greenland Rare Earth Minerals Chinese investment in Kvanefjeld, and Danish authorities’ 2018 intervention against a Chinese-linked airport construction bid worth roughly 17 percent of Greenland’s GDP, help explain why the deposit’s fate carries weight well beyond the litigants. For now, one of the largest known rare earth deposits outside China sits locked in litigation, and the next move belongs to the courts in Nuuk.