Myanmar Economy: ICJ Case, ICC Warrant, and Sanctions

Myanmar’s military government is the target of overlapping sanctions and lawsuits on several fronts: a genocide case against the state at the International Court of Justice, a pending International Criminal Court arrest warrant for the commander-in-chief, universal jurisdiction prosecutions in Argentina and other national courts, and layered financial and trade sanctions imposed by the United States, European Union, and United Kingdom against military-owned conglomerates, state banks, oil and gas revenue, and arms suppliers. The pressure has built since the February 2021 coup, though some of the underlying investigations reach back to the 2016 and 2017 operations against the Rohingya.

The Genocide Case at the International Court of Justice

The highest-stakes lawsuit is The Gambia v. Myanmar, filed at the ICJ in November 2019. The Gambia alleges that Myanmar violated the 1948 Genocide Convention through its military’s treatment of the Rohingya population, particularly during the 2016 and 2017 “clearance operations” in Rakhine State.¹

Public hearings on the merits ran from January 12 to 29, 2026, presided over by ICJ President Judge Iwasawa Yuji. The proceedings included oral arguments from both sides and closed sessions featuring testimony from Rohingya survivors.² The Gambia argued that the cumulative pattern of violence left no reasonable inference other than genocide. Myanmar contended that alternative explanations such as counter-insurgency operations were plausible.³

Eleven states have filed declarations of intervention. A final, legally binding judgment is expected six to twelve months after the hearings concluded.² The Court had already ordered Myanmar in January 2020 to take provisional measures to prevent genocidal acts and preserve evidence, and in July 2022 it rejected Myanmar’s challenge to its jurisdiction.⁴

The ICC Arrest Warrant Request for Min Aung Hlaing

Separately, the International Criminal Court has been investigating alleged crimes against humanity since Pre-Trial Chamber III authorized the inquiry in November 2019. Myanmar is not an ICC member, so the investigation rests on the fact that the crimes of deportation and persecution occurred in part on the territory of Bangladesh, which is a member.⁵

On November 27, 2024, ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan applied for an arrest warrant against Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the military’s commander-in-chief and acting president. The application alleges responsibility for the deportation and persecution of the Rohingya between August and December 2017, and it is the first warrant request targeting a senior Myanmar official. The Prosecutor indicated that additional requests would follow.⁶⁷

As of mid-2026 the application remains pending before Pre-Trial Chamber I. An ICC spokesperson confirmed in April 2026 that there is no set timeframe for a decision and that Min Aung Hlaing’s assumption of the civilian title of president provides no immunity.⁸ Legal commentators have called the deliberation period unusually long compared to previous warrant requests for heads of state.⁹ If issued, the warrant would legally obligate all ICC member countries to arrest and transfer him should he enter their territory.

National Court Cases Under Universal Jurisdiction

National courts in several countries have opened or received criminal complaints under universal jurisdiction, which allows them to prosecute certain international crimes regardless of where the crimes occurred.

Argentina

The most advanced of these is in Argentina, where the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK filed a complaint in November 2019. In February 2025, federal judge Maria Romilda Servini de Cubria issued arrest warrants for 25 individuals: 22 military officials and three civilians, including Min Aung Hlaing, Deputy Commander-in-Chief Soe Win, and former Western Command head Maung Maung Soe. The charges include genocide and crimes against humanity, specifically aggravated murder, sexual abuse, torture, forced disappearance, and slavery.¹⁰¹¹

The ruling triggers a process to request Interpol Red Notices across the 196 member states, though as of late February 2025 those notices had not yet been issued.¹² Enforcement inside Myanmar is considered unlikely, but the warrants can restrict the named officials’ international travel.

Other Jurisdictions

Australia: Legal Action Worldwide submitted a criminal complaint in October 2025 regarding post-coup crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Australian Federal Police is considering it.
Germany: Fortify Rights and 16 complainants filed a detailed complaint in January 2023. The Federal Public Prosecutor General declined to investigate in September 2023, citing a lack of suspects in Germany.
Indonesia: Human rights leaders filed a complaint in April 2026 alleging genocide by Min Aung Hlaing. No response from authorities has been announced.
United Kingdom: The Metropolitan Police’s Counter Terrorism Command has opened “structural investigations” identifying witnesses and examining alleged crimes.

Further complaints have been filed in the Philippines, Timor-Leste, and Türkiye but have not advanced past initial filing.¹³

US, EU, and UK Sanctions

Western sanctions are the primary economic lever against the junta. They target the military leadership, two state-owned conglomerates and their subsidiaries, state banks, natural resource revenue, and the arms supply chain.

United States

US sanctions operate under Executive Order 14014, signed on February 11, 2021. The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated Myanma Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) and Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) on March 25, 2021. Under OFAC’s Fifty Percent Rule, those designations extend automatically to dozens of majority-owned subsidiaries across mining, manufacturing, trading, and consumer goods.¹⁴

Later rounds hit a broader slice of the military economy:

Energy: OFAC prohibited financial services to the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) effective October 2023.¹⁵
Natural resources: Myanmar Gems Enterprise was sanctioned in April 2021, along with timber and pearl enterprises.
Financial institutions: Two state-owned banks and the Ministry of Defense were sanctioned in June 2023.
Arms supply chain: Jet fuel suppliers, military aircraft suppliers, and arms dealers were designated in multiple rounds through 2023.¹⁶

OFAC continued issuing Burma-related designations through at least November 2025. In July 2025, however, the Trump administration reportedly rolled back some sanctions to pursue access to Myanmar’s rare earth minerals, a move the UN Special Rapporteur called “a major step backward.”¹⁷

European Union

The EU has imposed eight packages of sanctions, covering 105 individuals and 22 entities as of 2026. Measures include asset freezes, an arms embargo, export bans on dual-use goods, and travel bans. The current measures run until April 30, 2027.¹⁸

United Kingdom

The UK runs its own regime under The Myanmar (Sanctions) Regulations 2021, which includes asset freezes, trade prohibitions on military goods, and restrictions on providing financial services or military assistance to the Tatmadaw. As of mid-2026, the UK has sanctioned 25 individuals and 39 entities since the coup.¹⁹ Penalties for violations reach seven years’ imprisonment for financial sanctions breaches and ten years for trade sanctions breaches.²⁰

Corporate and Revenue Pressure

Oil and Gas

Natural gas has long been one of the junta’s largest sources of foreign revenue, generating more than $1 billion a year according to Human Rights Watch. On January 21, 2022, after sustained pressure from advocacy groups and investors, TotalEnergies and Chevron announced their withdrawal from the offshore Yadana gas project. TotalEnergies cited the “worsening human rights situation” and withdrew without financial compensation; Chevron cited unspecified “circumstances.”²¹

The pipeline revenue did not stop. In April 2024, Justice for Myanmar filed legal complaints with the governors of Bermuda and the Cayman Islands, alleging that two pipeline companies, Moattama Gas Transportation Company Limited (registered in Bermuda) and Andaman Transportation Limited (registered in the Cayman Islands), were breaching UK sanctions by continuing business with MOGE. Justice for Myanmar estimated the two generated more than $754 million in pipeline revenues between 2021 and 2024, with MOGE’s share at roughly $239 million.²² As of November 2025, neither territory had taken formal enforcement action, and both companies were still operating.¹⁹

Rare Earths

A newer front involves Myanmar’s rare earth industry. The country provides roughly two-thirds of the world’s heavy rare earth elements, nearly all exported to China. Global Witness reported imports of heavy rare earth oxides from Myanmar to China reached 41,700 tonnes in 2023, more than double China’s official domestic mining quota.²³ ISP-Myanmar estimated total exports exceeded $3.6 billion in the four years after the coup, over five times the value of the preceding period.²⁴

The extraction is largely unregulated and controlled by military-aligned militias, particularly in Kachin State, where researchers identified more than 370 mining sites. Global Witness and others have urged governments to impose import restrictions unless supply chains can be verified free of human rights abuses. No government has done so; India and the United States have instead moved to secure access to Myanmar’s rare earth supplies.¹⁷

The Evidence Behind the Cases: The IIMM

Many of these proceedings draw on the UN Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, established by the Human Rights Council in 2018 to collect and preserve evidence of serious international crimes committed in Myanmar since 2011. As of August 2025, the IIMM had compiled evidence from more than 1,300 sources, including over 600 eyewitness accounts, geospatial imagery, and forensic material. It runs specialized units for open-source investigation, financial aspects of crimes, and gender-based violence.²⁵

The Mechanism shares case files with the ICC, the ICJ, Argentina’s investigation, and the UK, among others, and supported The Gambia during the January 2026 merits hearings.²⁶ It is also under financial strain: it has lost two of three US grants and risks shutting its open-source investigative unit without additional funding.²⁵

The Economic Backdrop

These legal and sanctions pressures sit on top of a collapsing economy. Myanmar’s GDP contracted by 9% between 2020 and 2024, and by a cumulative 16% since 2020 once the additional 2.7% contraction in 2025 is counted.²⁷²⁸ The kyat fell from roughly 1,330 per US dollar at the time of the coup to 4,520 by early 2025. Inflation hit 25.4% in 2024 and has been estimated at 30 to 38% for 2025. More than half the population has fallen into poverty, and over 3.5 million people are internally displaced.²⁹

The Financial Action Task Force has designated Myanmar a “High-Risk Jurisdiction subject to a Call for Action,” effectively blacklisting the country over failures on money laundering and terrorist financing. The designation, confirmed again in February 2026, requires financial institutions worldwide to apply enhanced due diligence on Myanmar-linked transactions and warns of possible counter-measures if no progress is made by June 2026.³⁰ At the same time, the illicit economy has grown: Myanmar is now the world’s leading producer of opium and heroin, and online scam operations have spread across the country.²⁷

The military junta controls roughly 30% of the country’s territory, mainly the central Bamar heartland and major cities, while resistance forces hold or contest the rest. A junta-backed party won elections held between December 2025 and January 2026, but the civil war continues, and the economic implosion keeps deepening.²⁸

1
International Court of Justice. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar)
2
Legal Action Worldwide. A Historic Milestone for Justice: Merits Hearings Begin in The Gambia v. Myanmar Genocide Case
3
Opinio Juris. From Fact-Finding to Fact-Proving at the ICJ
4
UN News. ICJ Begins Merits Hearings in Gambia v. Myanmar Genocide Case
5
International Criminal Court. Situation in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar
6
International Criminal Court. Statement of ICC Prosecutor on Application for Arrest Warrant
7
Human Rights Watch. Myanmar: ICC Prosecutor Requests Arrest Warrant
8
Democratic Voice of Burma. ICC Confirms Min Aung Hlaing Presidency Grants No Immunity From Arrest Warrant
9
Opinio Juris. The Lengthy Wait for an Arrest Warrant for the Acting Head of State of Myanmar Before the ICC
10
Jurist. Argentina Court Issues Arrest Warrants for Myanmar Military Officials Over Rohingya Genocide
11
Global Justice Center. Argentina Myanmar Universal Jurisdiction Case Update
12
Verfassungsblog. Argentinian Arrest Warrant for Hlaing
13
UN Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar. Universal Jurisdiction
14
US Department of the Treasury. Treasury Sanctions Military Holding Companies in Burma
15
US Department of the Treasury. Burma Sanctions Program
16
US Department of State. Burma Sanctions
17
London School of Economics. Extracting Rare Earths, Exploiting Frontiers
18
Council of the European Union. Sanctions Against Myanmar
19
Finance Uncovered. UK Overseas Territories Enabling Huge Sums to Flow to Myanmar Junta
20
UK Government. Myanmar Sanctions Guidance
21
The Guardian. Chevron and Total Withdraw From Myanmar Gas Project
22
Justice for Myanmar. Bermuda and Cayman Islands Must Take Action Against Oil Companies
23
Global Witness. Fuelling the Future, Poisoning the Present: Myanmar’s Rare Earth Boom
24
ISP Myanmar. Cries Behind Critical Minerals
25
UN Geneva Newsroom. Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar: Launch of Annual Report
26
UN Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar. Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar
27
UN News. Myanmar Economy Contracts Amid Crisis
28
ISP Myanmar. State of Myanmar 2026
29
East Asia Forum. Myanmar Without a Path to Recovery
30
FATF. High-Risk Jurisdictions Subject to a Call for Action