A police accountability act is a state or local law that rewrites the rules for when officers can use force, how misconduct gets investigated, and who gets to look over a department’s shoulder. Most of these laws passed after 2020, and they target problems that older policy left open: vague use-of-force standards, officers quietly rehired after being fired for misconduct, and civilian complaints that went nowhere. At the federal level, Executive Order 14074 imposed similar reforms on federal law enforcement agencies in 2022. Broader federal legislation has been introduced repeatedly but has not become law. What any given act actually changes depends on which jurisdiction passed it and how strictly its provisions are enforced.
Tighter Use of Force Rules
The centerpiece of most accountability acts is a higher bar for using physical force. Older policy generally tracked the Supreme Court’s 1989 decision in Graham v. Connor, which asked only whether force was “objectively reasonable” and gave officers wide latitude. Nearly half of police agencies in the 100 largest U.S. cities have shifted toward a “necessary” standard that goes beyond Graham, requiring officers to try verbal commands and de-escalation before using force.1Stanford Law School. Raising the Standard for Using Force Force also has to be proportional to the threat, and the officer’s own conduct leading up to the confrontation is part of the analysis.
These laws also outlaw specific tactics. Executive Order 14074, signed in May 2022, required all federal law enforcement agencies to prohibit chokeholds and carotid restraints except where deadly force is authorized by law. Many state-level accountability acts contain the same bans. The executive order also restricted no-knock entries by federal agents and required agencies to report every such entry each year, broken down by whether it was authorized by a court or justified by emergency circumstances.2GovInfo. Executive Order 14074 – Advancing Effective, Accountable Policing and Criminal Justice Practices to Enhance Public Trust and Public Safety The Justice for Breonna Taylor Act, pending in Congress, would go further by conditioning federal funding on states and localities abandoning no-knock warrants entirely.3Congress.gov. S.3900 – Justice for Breonna Taylor Act
Duty to Intervene
A growing number of accountability acts place an affirmative duty on officers to stop a colleague from using excessive or unlawful force. Before these provisions, an officer who stood by while a partner beat a handcuffed suspect faced no formal legal consequence in most jurisdictions. The Department of Justice now requires every DOJ law enforcement officer to “recognize and act upon the affirmative duty to intervene to prevent or stop” any use of force that violates the Constitution, federal law, or department policy.4U.S. Department of Justice. Department of Justice Policy on Use of Force State accountability acts extend this duty to local and state officers and often attach discipline, or in some cases criminal penalties, for failing to intervene.
Limits on Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity is a court-created doctrine that shields government officials from personal liability in civil rights suits unless they violated a “clearly established” right. The standard is so narrow that an officer often avoids liability unless a prior case with nearly identical facts already ruled the same conduct unlawful. Novel misconduct is almost never “clearly established” because no earlier case addressed it.
Only Congress or the Supreme Court can change federal qualified immunity, so accountability acts attack the problem at the state level. Four states have completely barred officers from raising qualified immunity as a defense in state court, and two additional states plus New York City have enacted partial limitations.5Institute for Justice. Qualified Immunity State Reforms These laws typically create a new state-level cause of action for violations of rights protected by the state constitution, which sidesteps the federal doctrine.
Other provisions shift financial exposure from the officer to the employing agency or municipality, on the theory that departments will invest more in training and supervision when they absorb the cost of settlements. Some jurisdictions pair this with liability insurance requirements, and a few proposals would let insurers set premiums based on an individual officer’s complaint record. At the federal level, the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act was reintroduced in September 2025 and would create a federal cause of action with limited qualified immunity. As of early 2026, the bill remains in committee.6Congress.gov. George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2025
Decertification and Misconduct Tracking
One of the oldest problems in policing is the “wandering officer” who gets fired for misconduct in one department and hired by another across county or state lines. Accountability acts attack this by requiring agencies to report disciplinary actions, terminations, and internal investigation outcomes to a centralized state authority, so a hiring department can see an applicant’s history before putting them back in a uniform.
At the national level, the International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training maintains the National Decertification Index, which collects records from 49 participating state agencies and Washington, D.C. The index covers verified decertifications resulting from proven misconduct, with identifying information and the relevant certifying authority. It has historically had gaps. Some populous states were slow to join, many departments did not check it before hiring, and the names were not publicly accessible. Newer reforms push toward mandatory participation and broader access.
Decertification itself is the revocation of an officer’s state-issued license to practice law enforcement. By 2014, 44 states had some process for stripping certification after serious misconduct, though the grounds and procedures vary. Some states require a criminal conviction first; others allow administrative revocation after a hearing. Officers generally have a right to appeal through an administrative process. Once decertified, an officer cannot work in law enforcement anywhere in that state, and the record appears in the national index for other states to check.
Civilian Oversight and Independent Investigations
Accountability acts formalize outside oversight of police conduct, usually through civilian review boards. The authority of these boards varies dramatically. A weak board reviews completed internal affairs investigations and recommends policy changes. A stronger one runs its own investigations, interviews witnesses, and issues findings that can trigger discipline.
The effectiveness of any board turns on whether it can compel cooperation. Some accountability acts grant subpoena power so boards can force the production of documents and testimony. Without that authority, a board depends on voluntary cooperation from the department, which is often incomplete. Even with subpoena power, enforcement is not automatic. The board typically has to petition a court to compel compliance if an officer or department refuses, and that process can mean protracted litigation.7National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement. Should the Oversight Entity Have Subpoena Power Some state courts have further narrowed oversight subpoenas by requiring judicial pre-approval before they can be issued.
A separate strand of reform takes the most serious incidents out of local hands entirely. When an officer uses deadly force or a person dies in custody, an independent entity, typically the state attorney general’s office or a dedicated independent investigations division, handles the case instead of the involved department’s internal affairs unit. The reform targets a basic conflict of interest in letting a department investigate its own officers in the most consequential cases.
Data Reporting and Body Cameras
Accountability acts commonly require departments to collect and publicly report detailed data on stops, arrests, searches, and uses of force, including the race, ethnicity, and gender of the people involved. Annual publication lets the public and researchers spot patterns of biased enforcement. The federal picture is weaker. The FBI’s national use-of-force database lacks mandatory participation, and as recently as 2020, only about 40 percent of the nation’s sworn officers were represented in the data.
Body-worn camera mandates work alongside these reporting rules. Executive Order 14074 required federal law enforcement agencies to publicly post their body-worn camera policies.8U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General. Body Worn Camera Policies State and local accountability acts generally go further, specifying when cameras must be activated, how long footage is stored, and when the public can obtain recordings after critical incidents like officer-involved shootings. Request processes differ by jurisdiction, and some agencies charge for redacting and producing video. A camera mandate without clear disclosure rules can produce footage that exists but is never released.
Federal Pattern-or-Practice Investigations
When a department’s problems are systemic rather than isolated, the federal government has a stronger, if infrequently used, tool. Under 34 U.S.C. § 12601, it is unlawful for any government authority to engage in a pattern or practice of law enforcement conduct that deprives people of their constitutional rights.9Office of the Law Revision Counsel. United States Code Title 34 – 12601 When the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe a violation has occurred, the DOJ can bring a civil action seeking court-ordered reforms.
These cases typically end in consent decrees, which are court-supervised agreements requiring the department to overhaul specific practices over a period of years. A decree might mandate new use-of-force policies, better training, revamped complaint systems, or independent monitoring. Departments operating under decrees face ongoing judicial oversight and must show measurable progress before the decree is lifted. The statute covers both law enforcement agencies and agencies responsible for juvenile justice and incarceration.
How aggressively the DOJ pursues these cases depends on the administration in power. Some have opened dozens of investigations; others have effectively frozen the program. That volatility is a major reason state accountability acts exist in the first place: they build reform mechanisms that do not depend on federal priorities.
Why Accountability Laws Can Stall
Well-drafted accountability legislation often runs into resistance during implementation, and police union contracts are the usual friction point. Collective bargaining agreements frequently restrict how quickly an officer can be interviewed after a use-of-force incident, limit the retention of complaint records, require expungement of disciplinary files after a set number of years, and create appeals that effectively override supervisory discipline. These provisions do not directly conflict with accountability statutes, but they can make enforcement slow and uncertain.
Some contracts also narrow civilian oversight by requiring complaints to be signed and sworn, which blocks anonymous tips, or by limiting the window for filing complaints to a few months. When an accountability act gives a civilian board investigative power but the union contract creates procedural barriers to interviewing officers, the board’s authority exists on paper and stalls in practice. Jurisdictions that have made strong accountability reforms stick have generally done so by changing contract language at the bargaining table alongside the legislation.
Criminal accountability has limits of its own. Federal law under 18 U.S.C. § 242 makes it a crime for anyone acting under color of law to willfully deprive a person of their constitutional rights.10U.S. Department of Justice. Law Enforcement Misconduct The “willfully” standard requires proof that the officer deliberately intended to violate someone’s rights, not merely that the officer used poor judgment. Federal prosecutions of officers remain rare for that reason, which is part of why state accountability acts focus on civil liability and administrative consequences rather than relying on criminal prosecution alone.