Recent First Amendment cases from the Supreme Court have reshaped how the government may interact with social media platforms, when employers must grant religious accommodations, what qualifies as a criminal “true threat” online, and whether a public official can block you on Facebook. Several of the most watched rulings turned on procedural grounds rather than sweeping declarations, so the headline often misstates the holding. What follows is what the Court actually decided, and what each decision changes for you.
Government Pressure on Social Media Companies
Two decisions in a single term bracket the question of when federal and state officials cross the line from persuading private platforms to coercing them.
In Murthy v. Missouri, two states and several users sued federal officials who had communicated with platforms like Facebook about COVID-19 and election content. A lower court issued a broad injunction against the government “coercing or significantly encouraging” removal of protected speech. The Supreme Court never reached the merits. In a 6-3 ruling in June 2024, it held that no plaintiff had Article III standing, because none could tie their specific injuries closely enough to government conduct rather than to the platforms’ independent moderation decisions. Several platforms had already been removing the plaintiffs’ posts before the challenged government contacts began.1Supreme Court of the United States. Murthy v. Missouri
The practical consequence is that the government-censorship-by-proxy question stays open at the Supreme Court. Future plaintiffs will need a tight, documented chain between a specific government action and a specific content removal that harmed them.2Constitution Annotated. Murthy v. Missouri – The First Amendment and Government Influence on Social Media Companies Content Moderation
NRA v. Vullo showed what that chain can look like. The NRA alleged that a New York financial regulator used her authority over insurers and banks to pressure them into cutting ties with the organization because of its advocacy. A unanimous Court held the NRA had stated a plausible First Amendment claim. The governing test, drawn from Bantam Books v. Sullivan, asks whether an official’s conduct, in context, could reasonably be read as a threat of adverse government action aimed at punishing speech. Courts weigh the official’s word choice and tone, whether they had regulatory authority over the third party, whether the third party perceived a threat, and whether the communication referenced consequences for noncompliance. That last factor carries particular weight.3Supreme Court of the United States. National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo
Read together, the two cases say that informal government “jawboning” can violate the First Amendment, but only when a plaintiff can show both coercive conduct and a direct causal line to the harm.
State Laws Forcing Platforms to Carry Speech
Texas and Florida passed laws aimed at preventing large social media platforms from removing users or demoting content based on viewpoint. In Moody v. NetChoice and NetChoice v. Paxton, the Supreme Court vacated both lower court decisions and sent the cases back. Neither appeals court had properly analyzed the laws as facial challenges, which require weighing a statute’s unconstitutional applications against its legitimate ones across the full range of services covered, not just the familiar feeds like Facebook’s News Feed or YouTube’s homepage.4Supreme Court of the United States. Moody v. NetChoice, LLC
The remand is procedural, but the opinion’s language on the merits is pointed. The Court reaffirmed, drawing on the newspaper right-of-reply precedents, that a private entity curating others’ speech is engaged in protected expressive activity. A platform’s choices about what to feature, demote, or remove are editorial judgments, and the government cannot override them merely by asserting an interest in balancing public debate.4Supreme Court of the United States. Moody v. NetChoice, LLC
Some provisions of these laws may survive on remand, especially those reaching functions that don’t involve editorial judgment, like direct messaging. The core content-moderation provisions face steep constitutional problems.
True Threats and the Recklessness Standard
Counterman v. Colorado resolved a split over what the state must prove when it prosecutes someone for a true threat. The defendant had sent a Colorado musician hundreds of Facebook messages over several years, some referencing her physical movements, and was convicted under a stalking statute. Before this case, some courts applied a purely objective test, asking only whether a reasonable person would perceive the statement as threatening.5Justia. Counterman v. Colorado
In 2023, the Court held that the First Amendment requires some subjective awareness on the speaker’s part, but set the bar at recklessness rather than intent. The prosecution must prove the speaker consciously disregarded a substantial risk that their communications would be viewed as threatening violence. A speaker who genuinely didn’t realize their words could be read as a threat cannot be convicted. A speaker who understood the risk and sent the messages anyway can be.6Supreme Court of the United States. Counterman v. Colorado
Religion at Work and on Public Property
Kennedy v. Bremerton: Prayer by a Public Employee
A Washington high school football coach lost his job after kneeling to pray on the 50-yard line after games. The district said allowing the practice would violate the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court sided with the coach and formally retired the Lemon test, which had governed Establishment Clause cases for over 50 years. Courts now evaluate Establishment Clause questions by reference to historical practices and understandings, with coercion as the critical line. The Clause does not require the government to be hostile to religion or to strip religious expression from public life.7Supreme Court of the United States. Kennedy v. Bremerton School District
For public employees, personal religious expression on government property is not automatically an establishment problem. A teacher or coach praying during non-instructional time is exercising a personal right. The analysis changes if students or subordinates feel pressured to join in.
Groff v. DeJoy: A Higher Bar for Denying Religious Accommodations
For decades, employers could refuse religious scheduling accommodations by showing anything more than a trivial, “de minimis” cost. In Groff v. DeJoy, a unanimous Court threw out that reading of Title VII. The case involved a postal carrier who could not work Sundays because of his Sabbath observance.8U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Religious Discrimination
The new standard asks whether granting an accommodation would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of the employer’s particular business. The word “particular” is doing real work: a large corporation will have a harder time claiming hardship than a small shop. Courts look at the specific accommodation requested, its practical impact, and the nature, size, and operating costs of the business.8U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Religious Discrimination
If you believe your employer wrongly denied a religious accommodation, you can file a charge with the EEOC within 180 calendar days of the discriminatory act, extended to 300 days where a state or local agency enforces a similar law. Federal employees must contact their agency’s EEO counselor within 45 days.9U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Time Limits For Filing A Charge
Compelled Speech and Creative Services
In 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, a Colorado web designer wanted to offer wedding websites but objected on religious grounds to designing them for same-sex weddings. Colorado’s public accommodation law would have required her to design those sites if she offered the service at all. The Court held that the First Amendment prohibits the state from forcing a designer to create expressive content conveying messages she disagrees with.10Supreme Court of the United States. 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis
The ruling is narrower than it may sound. It covers services that are genuinely expressive, such as custom graphic design, website creation, or speechwriting, where the product itself communicates a message. Selling a pre-made product, serving food, or renting a hotel room does not. A business cannot invoke 303 Creative to refuse service based on who the customer is; the question is whether the specific request would force the owner to speak a message they oppose. The line between expressive and non-expressive commercial services will be litigated for years, with photographers, florists, and videographers the obvious next battlegrounds.10Supreme Court of the United States. 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis
When a Public Official Blocks You on Social Media
In March 2024, the Court decided Lindke v. Freed and O’Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier and established a nationwide test. Blocking a user on social media counts as state action only if the official (1) possessed actual authority granted by the state to speak on the matter at issue, and (2) was purporting to exercise that authority in the posts in question. Both prongs must be met.11Legal Information Institute. Lindke v. Freed
A school board member who posts only vacation photos is not acting as the state, even if the bio mentions the office. The same person announcing policy changes and fielding complaints about curriculum through that account is building a public forum, and blocking a critic there can violate the First Amendment. The Court flagged a useful indicator: an account carrying a label like “this is the personal page of” the official is entitled to a strong presumption that its posts are personal. Without such a label, courts evaluate each post’s content and function. Posts invoking government authority to make announcements unavailable elsewhere lean toward official action.12Supreme Court of the United States. Lindke v. Freed
A user who was blocked in violation of this standard can sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seek an order unblocking the account, along with attorney’s fees under § 1988.13Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 42 US Code 1983 – Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights14Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 42 USC 1988 – Proceedings in Vindication of Civil Rights
Student Speech Away From School
Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L. involved a high school cheerleader suspended from the squad after posting a profanity-laden Snapchat message from a convenience store criticizing the school’s decisions. The Court ruled in 2021 that while schools are not powerless over off-campus speech, their authority is significantly diminished outside school grounds. Schools rarely stand in for parents when a student speaks off campus; regulating both on- and off-campus speech could reach everything a student says around the clock; and public schools have an interest in protecting unpopular student expression as part of their democratic role.15Justia. Mahanoy Area School District v. B. L.
Schools can still act when off-campus speech involves serious bullying or harassment of specific individuals, threats to students or staff, violations of rules governing online school activities, or breaches of school security systems. The cheerleader’s post, crude as it was, fit none of those categories, and the First Amendment protected it.16Supreme Court of the United States. Mahanoy Area School District v. B. L.
Liability for Organizing a Protest
McKesson v. Doe grew out of a Black Lives Matter demonstration in Baton Rouge, where an unidentified participant threw an object that seriously injured a police officer. The officer sued the organizer, DeRay Mckesson, on a negligence theory. The Fifth Circuit allowed the claim to proceed, reasoning that Mckesson should have known the protest could turn violent given its proximity to a highway. The Supreme Court denied review in April 2024, leaving that decision in place for now.17Supreme Court of the United States. McKesson v. Doe
The underlying First Amendment rule has not changed: advocacy of illegal conduct is protected unless it is directed to producing imminent lawless action and is likely to do so.18Justia. Brandenburg v. Ohio Organizing a demonstration where someone else commits a crime has not historically met that threshold. McKesson shows that lower courts may try to use negligence theories to reach around the incitement standard, and the Supreme Court has not yet closed that path.
How to Enforce Your First Amendment Rights
The main vehicle for suing a government official who suppresses your speech, retaliates against your religious practice, or blocks you from a public forum is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It creates a federal cause of action against anyone who deprives you of constitutional rights while acting under government authority.13Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 42 US Code 1983 – Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights
Available remedies include compensatory damages for actual harm, injunctive relief ordering the government to stop the unconstitutional conduct, and declaratory relief establishing that your rights were violated. Punitive damages may be available against an individual official for particularly egregious conduct. Courts can also award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party, which is often what makes these cases financially viable.14Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 42 USC 1988 – Proceedings in Vindication of Civil Rights
The main obstacle is qualified immunity. An official can avoid personal liability by showing the right at issue was not “clearly established” at the time, meaning the law was specific enough that a reasonable official would have known the conduct was unconstitutional. The recent decisions above are themselves creating that clearly established law. After Lindke v. Freed, a city official who blocks a constituent for political criticism on an account used for government announcements will have a much harder time claiming they didn’t know better. Filing deadlines for Section 1983 claims vary by state but generally run two to four years from the date of the violation.