Reynolds v. United States is the 1879 Supreme Court decision holding that the First Amendment protects religious belief absolutely but does not exempt anyone from a criminal law that applies to everyone. The Court unanimously upheld George Reynolds’ bigamy conviction under a federal statute banning plural marriage in U.S. territories, ruling that religious duty is not a defense to a generally applicable criminal law. That belief-versus-conduct line is why the case still appears in free exercise arguments nearly a century and a half later.
The Case Behind the Ruling
In 1862, Congress passed the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act, which made bigamy in U.S. territories a crime punishable by up to $500 and five years in prison, and capped the value of real estate any religious or charitable organization could hold in a territory at $50,000.1Library of Congress. 12 U.S. Statutes at Large 501 – An Act to Punish and Prevent the Practice of Polygamy The statute reached only territories, where Congress governed directly, and it went largely unenforced for years until federal officials moved to build a test case.
George Reynolds, personal secretary to Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints president Brigham Young, agreed to serve as the defendant. Prosecutors charged him in the District Court for the Third Judicial District of the Territory of Utah with marrying Amelia Jane Schofield while his first wife, Mary Ann Tuddenham, was still living. A jury convicted him, and after appeals within the territorial system he was sentenced to two years of hard labor and a $500 fine. The case reached the Supreme Court on his constitutional challenge.2Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. Reynolds v. United States
The Constitutional Question
Reynolds’ defense rested entirely on the Free Exercise Clause. Members of his faith believed plural marriage was a divine command carrying serious spiritual consequences if refused. At trial, Reynolds asked the judge to instruct the jury that if they found he had married in conformity with what he sincerely believed to be a religious duty, they had to acquit. The judge refused.
That refusal framed the question for the Supreme Court: can Congress criminalize conduct that a person’s religion requires, or does sincere religious duty provide a defense against a criminal charge?
What the Court Decided
Chief Justice Morrison Waite delivered the unanimous opinion on January 6, 1879. The government cannot reach what a person believes, the Court held, but it can regulate what a person does. Religious opinions lie beyond the reach of law; religious conduct does not.2Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. Reynolds v. United States
To ground that line, the Court turned to the history behind the First Amendment. It cited the Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, drafted by Thomas Jefferson, which permitted government to intervene only when private beliefs “break out into overt acts against peace and good order.” It also cited Jefferson’s letter to the Danbury Baptist Association describing a “wall of separation between church and State” and stating that “the legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and not opinions.” Chief Justice Waite called the letter “almost an authoritative declaration” of the amendment’s scope.3Library of Congress. A Wall of Separation
The opinion then asked a practical question that has echoed through American law ever since. If religious belief could override criminal statutes, would not every person effectively become “a law unto himself”? The Court thought so. Congress had authority to regulate marriage in the territories, polygamy had long been treated as an offense against the social order, and religious doctrine could not sit above the law of the land. The Morrill Act was constitutional. Reynolds’ conviction stood.2Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. Reynolds v. United States
Why Reynolds Still Matters
The belief-conduct framework dominated free exercise law for nearly a century, but the Supreme Court did not apply it in a straight line. The real story of the ruling’s legacy is how later courts departed from it and then circled back.
Sherbert v. Verner Raised the Bar
In 1963, the Court appeared to soften the Reynolds approach. In Sherbert v. Verner, it ruled that a Seventh-day Adventist fired for refusing to work on Saturdays could not be denied unemployment benefits. The government now had to show a “compelling interest” before it could burden someone’s religious exercise, even through a neutral law. For nearly three decades, that higher bar gave individuals more room to claim religious exemptions from generally applicable rules.4Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. Sherbert v. Verner
Employment Division v. Smith Restored Reynolds
In 1990, the Court swung back. Employment Division v. Smith involved two members of the Native American Church who were fired and denied unemployment benefits after using peyote in a religious ceremony. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia cited Reynolds directly and held that the Free Exercise Clause does not excuse a person from obeying a “neutral law of general applicability,” even when that law burdens religious practice. If a law is not targeting religion and applies equally to everyone, the government need not justify the burden at all.5Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. Employment Division v. Smith Smith essentially restored the Reynolds framework in modern dress: the belief-conduct line became the neutral-and-generally-applicable line.
RFRA and the Continuing Fight
Smith drew a bipartisan backlash in Congress. In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, finding that the Supreme Court had “virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion.” RFRA restored the compelling interest test from Sherbert, requiring the government to show that any substantial burden on religious exercise serves a compelling interest and uses the least restrictive means available.6Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 42 USC 2000bb – Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purposes
The Supreme Court later ruled that RFRA could not be applied against state and local governments, limiting its reach to federal law. But the statute remains a powerful tool for challenging federal regulations that burden religious practice. The tension Reynolds first identified between a government’s right to enforce its laws and an individual’s right to live by their faith continues to generate litigation. As recently as 2021, in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, several justices signaled interest in revisiting the Smith framework, though the Court resolved the case on narrower grounds. The “law unto himself” warning from 1879 still anchors one side of the debate, and whether it should is a question the Court has not finished answering.