Richardson v. Ramirez is the 1974 U.S. Supreme Court decision that upheld the power of states to deny voting rights to people convicted of felonies, even after they finish their sentences. By a 6–3 vote issued on June 24, 1974, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit felon disenfranchisement, because Section 2 of the amendment explicitly contemplates the practice.1Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. Richardson v. Ramirez More than fifty years on, the ruling is still the constitutional foundation for state laws that range from no restrictions at all to permanent loss of the vote.
The Dispute Behind the Case
Abran Ramirez and two other Californians tried to register to vote after finishing both prison and parole. County officials turned them away under provisions of the California Constitution that permanently barred anyone convicted of an “infamous crime” from voting. Article II, Section 3 stated that no such person “shall ever exercise the privilege of an elector in this State.”2Office of the Chief Clerk, California State Assembly. Constitution of the State of California
The men sued as a class of former felons who had completed every obligation the criminal system imposed on them. The California Supreme Court sided with them, holding the state provisions violated federal equal protection as applied to people who had finished their sentences and parole. County clerk Viola Richardson took the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.1Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. Richardson v. Ramirez
Why the Court Sided With California
Justice William Rehnquist wrote for the majority, and his reasoning turned on an unusual place in the Fourteenth Amendment. Most voting rights arguments live in Section 1, which contains the Equal Protection Clause. Rehnquist looked instead to Section 2, the provision that governs how congressional seats are apportioned. Section 2 says a state that denies its adult male citizens the vote should lose representation in Congress in proportion, but it carves out a specific exception for denials based on “participation in rebellion, or other crime.”3Cornell Law Institute. U.S. Constitution – 14th Amendment – Section 2
The logic ran like this. Section 1 cannot forbid what Section 2 openly permits. If the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment had understood equal protection to bar felon disenfranchisement, they would not have written a separate provision assuming states would practice it and simply declining to penalize them for it. The two sections had to be read together.1Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. Richardson v. Ramirez
History reinforced the text. When the amendment was ratified in 1868, many states already disenfranchised people convicted of crimes, and the drafters would have known that. Ordinarily, a state restriction on voting must survive strict scrutiny and rest on a compelling interest. Rehnquist concluded that felon disenfranchisement sits in a different constitutional category because the amendment’s own words anticipate it.1Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. Richardson v. Ramirez
Justice Marshall’s Dissent
Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented, and his opinion is still the standard counterargument. He read Section 2 as a narrow political compromise aimed at Southern states that were excluding newly freed Black citizens after the Civil War, not as a general license to strip voting rights from anyone with a criminal record. In his view, the majority let a specific remedial provision override the broader guarantees of Section 1.1Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. Richardson v. Ramirez
Marshall rejected freezing constitutional meaning at 1868, writing that “constitutional concepts of equal protection are not immutably frozen like insects trapped in Devonian amber.” Because voting is a fundamental right, he argued, any restriction on it should face strict scrutiny, and he saw no compelling interest in permanently barring people who had completed their sentences. He also called the common policy justification, that former felons might vote to weaken criminal laws, constitutionally impermissible: government cannot exclude people from the political process because of how they might vote.
The Racial Discrimination Limit: Hunter v. Underwood
Richardson has one clear boundary. In Hunter v. Underwood (1985), a unanimous Court struck down an Alabama provision that disenfranchised people convicted of crimes “involving moral turpitude,” a rule adopted at the state’s 1901 constitutional convention with the explicit purpose of disenfranchising Black voters.4Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. Hunter v. Underwood
Rehnquist himself wrote the opinion, and it stated that “nothing in our opinion in Richardson v. Ramirez suggests the contrary.”4Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. Hunter v. Underwood Section 2 permits felon disenfranchisement, but it does not shield laws enacted with racially discriminatory intent. A challenger who can prove that purpose can still win under the Equal Protection Clause.
How Richardson Shapes Modern Cases
The ruling still drives current litigation. In Jones v. Governor of Florida (2020), the Eleventh Circuit relied on Richardson to uphold Florida’s requirement that former felons pay outstanding fines, fees, and restitution before regaining the vote. The court reasoned that because states can disenfranchise felons entirely, laws governing re-enfranchisement need only survive rational basis review, the lowest level of judicial scrutiny. Florida’s financial conditions cleared that bar.5Justia. Jones v. Governor of Florida
That reasoning extends Richardson’s logic beyond the original question. If a state can take the vote away, courts have generally concluded it can attach conditions to giving the vote back. Critics say this creates a two-tier system where former felons’ voting rights receive weaker protection than everyone else’s, the same concern Marshall voiced in 1974.
Where the States Stand Now
Because Richardson left the question to state policy, the rules vary widely. Maine, Vermont, and the District of Columbia never take the vote away, allowing people to vote from prison. Most states restore rights automatically after release, some after parole or probation, and a smaller group either impose indefinite loss for certain offenses or require a pardon or other affirmative step before restoration.6National Conference of State Legislatures. Restoration of Voting Rights for Felons
The trend has been toward expanding access. Nebraska in 2024 restored voting rights upon completion of a sentence including parole, and Tennessee in 2025 revised its restoration procedures and extended them to people convicted before 1973.6National Conference of State Legislatures. Restoration of Voting Rights for Felons These changes come through legislatures and ballot measures, the political channel Richardson pointed to.
California’s Own Reversal
The state that produced Richardson has moved a long way from it. In 2020, California voters approved Proposition 17, amending the state constitution to restore voting rights as soon as a prison term ends. The measure passed with roughly 59 percent of the vote. Today, the only Californians barred from voting because of a felony are those currently serving a prison sentence.
That trajectory captures what Richardson actually did and did not do. The decision does not require states to disenfranchise anyone. It holds only that the federal Constitution does not stop them. Whether felons vote, and on what terms, is a question Richardson left with the states, and the states have been answering it differently ever since.