Robert Kaluza and the Deepwater Horizon Criminal Case

Robert “Bob” Kaluza was the BP well site leader on the day shift of the Deepwater Horizon when the rig exploded on April 20, 2010, killing eleven workers and unleashing the largest offshore oil spill in United States history. Federal prosecutors indicted him on 23 counts, including manslaughter and a Clean Water Act violation. Every felony count was dismissed before trial, and in February 2016 a jury acquitted him of the remaining misdemeanor charge, ending a prosecution that had run more than six years.

Who Robert Kaluza Was

Kaluza held a degree in petroleum engineering and had roughly 35 years in the oil and gas industry, more than eight of them as a well site leader. He worked his way up through roles as a roughneck, driller, and toolpusher before joining BP in 1997 as a drilling engineer, later serving in a senior role at the company’s Thunder Horse installation and attaining the title of Well Site Leader, Deepwater.1Armin Lear Press. Bob Kaluza

Well site leaders were the highest-ranking BP employees aboard a drilling rig, often called “the company men.” They directed drill crews and contractors, kept in contact with BP engineers on shore, and were responsible for critical decisions about drilling operations, including conducting and assessing negative pressure tests to verify that a well was properly sealed.2Justia Law. United States v. Kaluza, No. 14-30122

Kaluza was not ordinarily assigned to the Deepwater Horizon. He arrived on the rig only four and a half days before the blowout, covering the day shift while Donald Vidrine, a 40-year BP veteran, worked nights.1Armin Lear Press. Bob Kaluza

What the Government Said He Did Wrong

On the afternoon of April 20, 2010, the crew ran a negative pressure test on the Macondo well to confirm it was sealed before BP moved to production. The results were troubling. The drill pipe held sustained pressure of roughly 1,500 psi while the kill line read zero, a discrepancy that government investigators later called a strong indicator the test had failed.3U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. Deepwater Horizon Blowout Preventer Failure Analysis The crew nonetheless deemed the test a success. Prosecutors would later allege that Kaluza and Vidrine ignored the abnormal readings and failed to notify shore-based engineers.4ABC News. BP Officials Charged in Gulf Spill

Kaluza’s shift had ended by the time the well blew out at 9:49 p.m. By his own account, he had gone to bed roughly two hours earlier and was startled awake by a fire alarm and blast. He helped crew members reach a lifeboat and survived.5Texas Monthly. Deepwater Horizon Prosecution Eleven workers were killed, and the resulting blowout sent millions of barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico over the next 87 days.

The 23 Federal Charges

In November 2012, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Louisiana returned a superseding indictment charging Kaluza and Vidrine each with 23 counts:

  • Eleven counts of involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. § 1112, one for each worker killed.
  • Eleven counts of seaman’s manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. § 1115, again one per victim.
  • One misdemeanor count of negligent discharge under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c)(1)(A) and 1321(b)(3).2Justia Law. United States v. Kaluza, No. 14-30122

Both men were arraigned on November 28, 2012, in federal court in New Orleans, pleaded not guilty, and were released on bond.6The Spokesman-Review. 3 BP Employees Arraigned on Gulf Oil Spill Charges The case was assigned to U.S. District Judge Stanwood R. Duval Jr.7U.S. Department of Justice. United States v. BP Exploration and Production Inc. The government’s theory was that Kaluza and Vidrine had known about abnormal drill-pipe pressure during the test, failed to investigate or alert onshore engineers, and declared the test a success despite clear warning signs.4ABC News. BP Officials Charged in Gulf Spill

How the Manslaughter Counts Fell Apart

Judge Duval dismissed the eleven seaman’s manslaughter counts in 2013, ruling the statute did not apply. On March 11, 2015, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Writing for the panel, Judge Patrick Higginbotham applied the interpretive principle of ejusdem generis: because the statute lists “captain, engineer, pilot, or other person employed on any vessel,” the catchall covered only those with responsibility for a vessel’s marine operations, maintenance, and navigation. Kaluza and Vidrine, as drilling supervisors with no role in navigating or operating the ship itself, fell outside its reach.2Justia Law. United States v. Kaluza, No. 14-30122 Higginbotham noted that the law had been enacted to address the dangers of steamboat travel and was meant to hold accountable the people responsible for that travel, not oil-well supervisors.8Courthouse News Service. No Seaman’s Manslaughter in BP Spill

On December 2, 2015, the Justice Department voluntarily dismissed the eleven involuntary manslaughter counts against both defendants. Spokesman Peter Carr said the decision came because “circumstances surrounding the case have changed since it was originally charged, and after a careful review the department determined it can no longer meet the legal standard for instituting the involuntary manslaughter charges.” Legal observers noted the government would have had to prove the defendants acted with wanton or reckless disregard for life, a burden that would have been extremely difficult to meet at trial.9Houston Chronicle. Manslaughter Charges Dropped for BP Supervisors

Only the single misdemeanor Clean Water Act count remained.

The 2016 Trial and Acquittal

Vidrine pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor as part of a deal to testify against Kaluza. Kaluza refused to plead and went to trial before Judge Duval in February 2016, represented by Houston trial lawyers David Gerger of Quinn Emanuel and Shaun Clarke.10The Dallas Morning News. Behind the Scenes of the Defense in the BP Criminal Trial

Vidrine testified on February 18, 2016, that Kaluza had not passed on critical information about the negative pressure test at shift change. According to Vidrine, Kaluza never told him they had been monitoring drill-pipe pressure rather than flow, never mentioned they had failed to achieve zero pressure for 30 minutes, and never raised concerns that the test might have been incomplete.11Houston Chronicle. BP Supervisor Testifies at Kaluza Trial Under cross-examination, Vidrine acknowledged a list of ten reasons he had been independently confident in the results of a second test he himself supervised. Asked whether his decision-making would have changed had he known the earlier drill-pipe test was bad, Vidrine replied, “Yeah, it might have.”12Daily Democrat. Ex-BP Supervisor Testifies Colleague Didn’t Pass On Info

Clarke told the jury Kaluza was a scapegoat and that the Macondo well “was under control during every single second of his watch.” The defense emphasized that no official government standards existed for the type of pressure test at issue, and that other rig workers with a combined 97 years of experience had agreed at the time that the test was successful. Gerger argued the disaster was caused by the failure of redundant safety equipment, including an improperly certified blowout preventer, not by the supervisors’ interpretation of test data.13The Seattle Times. Ex-BP Engineer’s Trial Nears End With Closing Arguments

On February 25, 2016, after less than two hours of deliberation, the jury found Kaluza not guilty.14The New York Times. BP Engineer Is Not Guilty in Case From 2010 Gulf Oil Spill

The Other BP Defendants

Kaluza was one of four BP employees individually charged. None ended up with a felony conviction. BP itself pleaded guilty to 14 criminal counts and agreed to pay $4.5 billion, including nearly $1.3 billion in criminal fines, at the time the largest criminal penalty in U.S. history.15Minnesota Public Radio News. BP to Pay $4.5 Billion in Oil Spill Settlement

Vidrine was sentenced in April 2016 to ten months’ probation, a $50,000 fine, and 100 hours of community service. He died of cancer at age 69 on June 3, 2017.16CT Post. BP Supervisor on Ill-Fated Deepwater Horizon Rig Dies David Rainey, a former BP vice president of exploration, was acquitted on June 5, 2015, of making false statements to congressional investigators about the volume of oil flowing from the well; the related obstruction count had been dismissed days earlier.17The New York Times. Ex-BP Executive Found Not Guilty BP engineer Kurt Mix was convicted in December 2013 of obstruction of justice for deleting text messages, but Judge Duval threw out the conviction after finding that the jury foreperson had been influenced by a conversation overheard in a courthouse elevator, and the Fifth Circuit upheld the order for a new trial in 2015.18Forbes. Former BP Engineer Kurt Mix Wins Appeal, Gets New Trial

What Kaluza Has Said Since

Kaluza was on paid leave from BP after the disaster and eventually accepted a buyout.5Texas Monthly. Deepwater Horizon Prosecution He has described the prosecution as a “vortex” of public outrage in which he and Vidrine served as convenient stand-ins for a catastrophe caused by decisions made far above their level.

“I feel like BP served me up to the government,” Kaluza told Forbes in 2018. He said no one from BP congratulated him after his acquittal and that “the system of injustice prescribes no apologies” and “there’s no compensation, there’s no line to stand in to get back 6 years of a productive life.”19Forbes. Two Years After Ruling, BP Engineer Still Carries Burden of Prosecution

In April 2018, Kaluza published a book with co-author Maryann Karinch, Deepwater Deception: The Truth About the Tragic Blowout & Perversion of American Justice.20Amazon. Deepwater Deception In it, he argues that BP struck a deal with the Justice Department that allowed the company to resume business while executives were protected, with lower-level employees offered up as scapegoats. He maintains he did nothing wrong and that the disaster was caused by flawed well design and decisions made by upper management.