South Africa vs. Israel: The ICJ Genocide Case and Provisional Measures

In the South Africa vs. Israel ICJ genocide case, South Africa accuses Israel of violating the 1948 Genocide Convention through its military operations in the Gaza Strip, and asks the International Court of Justice to order Israel to stop. South Africa filed the application on December 29, 2023. Since then the Court has issued three sets of binding provisional measures, at least ten countries have moved to intervene, and Israel has filed its written defense. A final judgment on whether genocide occurred is likely years away.

What South Africa Is Alleging

South Africa’s application is built on Article II of the Genocide Convention, which defines genocide as certain acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. The Convention lists five prohibited acts: killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately creating conditions of life designed to physically destroy the group, imposing measures to prevent births, and forcibly transferring children out of the group.¹ South Africa argues Israel’s conduct falls within the first three.

The specific allegations include large-scale killing of civilians through aerial bombardment and ground operations, the infliction of serious bodily and mental harm across the population, and the creation of conditions designed to bring about physical destruction by restricting food, water, fuel, and medical supplies. South Africa also argues that the displacement of nearly the entire population of Gaza into progressively smaller areas is a deliberate effort to destroy the group’s ability to survive.

Intent is the hardest part. Proving genocide requires showing that the perpetrator specifically intended to destroy the group, not merely that civilians were harmed during a military operation. To meet that bar, South Africa points to public statements by Israeli government and military officials, arguing that the remarks either called for or justified the destruction of the Palestinian population in Gaza. Linking those statements to the pattern of military action is how South Africa tries to prove the intent element.

Israel’s Defense

Israel called South Africa’s application a “profoundly distorted factual and legal picture.” Its defense rests on three arguments.

First, self-defense. Israel argued that the measures South Africa sought would effectively prevent it from exercising its inherent right to defend itself after the October 7, 2023 attacks. Second, attribution. Israel’s legal team contended that responsibility for civilian deaths and destruction lay with Hamas, citing its use of schools and hospitals for military purposes, the booby-trapping of civilian homes, and misfired rockets. Israel’s representatives said the military had gone to “extraordinary efforts” to minimize civilian harm and that hospitals had not been bombed but rather searched for military infrastructure.

Third, no genocidal intent. Israel argued that the official statements South Africa cited were “clearly rhetorical, made in the immediate aftermath of an event which severely traumatised Israel” and could not reasonably be read as demanding genocide. Israel asked the Court to reject all requested provisional measures on the ground that they would advantage Hamas.

How the Court Has Authority to Hear the Case

The ICJ’s jurisdiction comes from Article IX of the Genocide Convention, which lets any party to the treaty submit disputes about its interpretation or fulfillment to the Court.¹ Both South Africa and Israel are parties, so neither has to give separate consent. The treaty itself is the hook.

A separate question is why South Africa can sue when it is not a neighbor of Israel and not directly involved in the fighting. The answer is the doctrine of erga omnes partes obligations, which are duties owed to all parties to a treaty collectively. The ICJ accepted that principle in The Gambia v. Myanmar (2022), concerning the Rohingya, holding that any state party to the Genocide Convention has standing to bring a claim when it believes another party is violating the treaty. South Africa does not need to show it was personally harmed. The duty to prevent genocide runs to every signatory.

The Provisional Measures the Court Has Ordered

Before deciding whether genocide occurred (a determination that comes years later at trial) the Court can order emergency measures to prevent irreparable harm while the case proceeds. It has done so three times.

January 26, 2024

The Court’s first order contained six directives, each adopted by overwhelming majorities. Only Judge Sebutinde (Uganda) voted against every measure, and Judge ad hoc Barak (Israel’s appointed judge) voted against four of six.²

Israel was ordered to:

Prevent all acts within the scope of Article II, covering killing, serious bodily or mental harm, destructive conditions of life, and measures to prevent births (15 to 2).
Ensure its military does not commit such acts (15 to 2).
Prevent and punish incitement to genocide (16 to 1, with Israel’s own appointed judge in favor).
Take immediate and effective measures to enable humanitarian assistance, including food, water, medical supplies, and fuel (16 to 1).
Preserve evidence related to allegations of genocide (15 to 2).
Report to the Court within one month on all steps taken to comply (15 to 2).

The Court did not order a ceasefire, which South Africa had requested, and did not find that genocide was occurring.²

March 28, 2024

As reports of famine spread, South Africa returned to the Court. The Court reaffirmed all six January directives (14 to 2) and added new ones focused on humanitarian access. Israel was ordered to take “all necessary and effective measures” to ensure the unhindered provision of food, water, electricity, fuel, shelter, clothing, hygiene supplies, and medical care throughout Gaza, including by increasing the capacity and number of land crossing points and keeping them open as long as necessary. That measure passed unanimously.³

The Court also ordered, by 15 to 1, that Israel’s military must not commit any acts that violate the rights of Palestinians as a protected group, including by preventing the delivery of humanitarian assistance. That language explicitly linked military operations to the obstruction of aid.³

May 24, 2024

When Israel launched a military offensive in Rafah, South Africa asked the Court to strengthen its measures. The resulting order was the most forceful yet. By 13 votes to 2, the Court ordered Israel to immediately halt its military offensive and any other action in the Rafah Governorate that could inflict conditions of life bringing about the physical destruction of the Palestinian group in whole or in part.⁴

Also by 13 to 2, Israel was ordered to keep the Rafah border crossing open for the unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid at scale, and to allow access for UN commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions, investigators, and journalists mandated to investigate allegations of genocide.⁴

Are the Orders Binding, and Can They Be Enforced?

They are binding. The ICJ settled the question in the LaGrand case (Germany v. United States) in 2001, holding that provisional measures under Article 41 of the ICJ Statute are “not a mere exhortation” but create legal obligations for the state addressed.⁵

Binding is not the same as enforceable. The ICJ has no police force and no ability to compel compliance directly. Under Article 94 of the UN Charter, if a party fails to comply with a Court judgment, the other party “may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.”⁶

That is where enforcement stalls. Any of the Security Council’s five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) can veto a resolution. The United States has vetoed multiple Security Council resolutions calling for a ceasefire in Gaza, including vetoes in June and September 2025.⁷ As long as that veto holds, no Security Council enforcement action against Israel over the ICJ orders is possible.

Which Countries Have Joined the Case

Because this case turns on interpreting the Genocide Convention, any state party to the Convention can intervene under Article 63 of the ICJ Statute. An intervening state does not become a party to the dispute but can submit its views on how the Convention should be read, and it becomes bound by the interpretation the Court eventually adopts.

As of March 2026, at least ten countries have filed formal declarations of intervention: Brazil (September 2025), the Comoros (October 2025), Belgium (December 2025), Paraguay (March 2026), Iceland and the Netherlands (both March 2026), and Fiji, Hungary, Namibia, and the United States (all March 2026).⁸ The interventions span a wide political spectrum. Countries such as Namibia and Brazil have been critical of Israel’s operations, while the United States and Hungary are expected to intervene in support of Israel’s legal position.

Where the Case Stands

The merits phase is under way. South Africa filed its Memorial, the formal written argument laying out its full case, on October 28, 2024. Israel’s Counter-Memorial was originally due on July 28, 2025, but the Court granted an extension, and Israel filed its response on March 12, 2026.⁹ South Africa is reviewing that response and will decide whether to request permission to file a Reply or to move directly to oral proceedings.

Earlier ICJ genocide cases give a sense of the timeline. Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia was filed in March 1993 and produced a final judgment in February 2007, roughly 14 years later.¹⁰ Croatia v. Serbia was filed in July 1999 and decided in February 2015, about 15 and a half years later.¹¹ If this case follows a similar trajectory, a merits judgment might not arrive until the late 2030s. The provisional measures remain in effect throughout.

Both of those earlier cases ended with the Court finding that the respondent state had not committed genocide, though Bosnia v. Serbia did find that Serbia had violated its obligation to prevent the Srebrenica genocide. Whether this case reaches a different result will depend heavily on the evidence presented regarding intent, which has historically been the most difficult element to prove in genocide litigation at the ICJ.

1
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
2
International Court of Justice. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel) – Order of 26 January 2024
3
International Court of Justice. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel) – Order of 28 March 2024
4
International Court of Justice. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel) – Order of 24 May 2024
5
International Court of Justice. LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America)
6
United Nations. Chapter XIV – The International Court of Justice
7
United Nations News. Security Council – US Votes Against Resolution on Gaza Ceasefire
8
International Court of Justice. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip
9
The Presidency – Republic of South Africa. South Africa Notes Israel’s Response Filing to the ICJ
10
International Court of Justice. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)
11
International Court of Justice. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia)