Stop Racial Profiling: Laws, Floyd, and Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo

Racial profiling laws in the United States are a patchwork: the Constitution supplies the baseline, two federal civil rights statutes allow lawsuits, a handful of states have enacted specific bans with data-collection requirements, and the Department of Justice has historically used court-enforceable consent decrees to force reform in departments found to engage in biased policing. No single federal statute prohibits racial profiling outright. What exists instead is a set of overlapping tools, each with meaningful limits on when and how it can be used.

Constitutional Rules That Govern Police Stops

Three Supreme Court decisions set the frame for any racial profiling claim.

Terry v. Ohio (1968) allows an officer to briefly stop and frisk a person without a warrant or probable cause so long as the officer can point to “specific and articulable facts” supporting a reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in criminal activity and may be armed.1Justia. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 The Court itself acknowledged that “wholesale harassment” of minority groups by police was a real concern but concluded that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule was not an effective tool to control it.2University of Chicago Legal Forum. Terry’s Original Sin

Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) stretched that standard further, ruling that unprovoked flight in a “high crime area” can itself supply the reasonable suspicion needed for a stop. Four justices in partial dissent warned that for residents of heavily policed neighborhoods, running from police may reflect fear of harassment rather than guilt.3Cornell Law Institute. Illinois v. Wardlow

Whren v. United States (1996) is the most important decision for anyone trying to challenge a pretextual traffic stop. The Court held unanimously that a stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as the officer had objective probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred, no matter what the officer’s actual motivations were.4Justia. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 The Court said that selective enforcement based on race does violate the Constitution, but any such claim must be brought under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth.5Oyez. Whren v. United States Equal protection claims require proof of intentional discrimination, which is difficult to establish on the facts of any single stop. The practical result is that pretextual stops are nearly immune to Fourth Amendment challenge even where racial patterns are stark.

Federal Statutes You Can Sue Under

Two federal statutes supply the civil remedies most often used against racial profiling by state and local police.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 lets a person sue state or local officers, municipalities, or agencies for constitutional violations. To hold a city liable, a plaintiff must show the injury resulted from an official policy, custom, or “deliberate indifference” to the risk of constitutional violations. Individual officers can invoke qualified immunity unless they violated “clearly established” law.6Congressional Research Service. Legal Tools To Challenge Racial Profiling

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits race, color, and national origin discrimination by any entity that receives federal financial assistance, including most police departments. When the Department of Justice enforces Title VI, it does not need to prove intentional discrimination; it can rely on a practice’s unjustified disparate impact on a protected group. Private plaintiffs who sue under Title VI, however, must still prove intentional discrimination, though they need show only that race was “a motivating factor.”7U.S. Department of Justice. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Federal Legislation That Would Ban Profiling Directly

Congress has not enacted a standalone federal ban. The End Racial Profiling Act has been introduced repeatedly over more than two decades. A 2019 version appeared as H.R. 4339 in the 116th Congress.8Congress.gov. End Racial Profiling Act of 2019 The bill was reintroduced in the 119th Congress as H.R. 5727 on October 10, 2025, by Representative Steve Cohen of Tennessee, with no cosponsors as of mid-2026.9Congress.gov. End Racial Profiling Act, H.R. 5727 None of these versions has advanced to a floor vote.

The broader George Floyd Justice in Policing Act incorporated the End Racial and Religious Profiling Act as an entire subtitle. It would have formally prohibited racial profiling, conditioned DOJ grant funding on anti-profiling policies, required data collection on all enforcement stops by race and ethnicity, and directed the Attorney General to develop best practices.10U.S. Senate. George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2024 The bill passed the House but stalled in the Senate and has not become law.

State Laws and Data Collection

With no federal ban in place, states have moved unevenly. As of early 2026, at least 24 states and the District of Columbia require or authorize law enforcement agencies to collect traffic stop data. Common requirements include the perceived race or ethnicity of the person stopped (20 states and D.C.), the reason for the stop (19 states and D.C.), and whether a search or seizure occurred (19 states and D.C.).11National Conference of State Legislatures. Traffic Stop Data

A smaller group of states — Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Kansas, Missouri, New Jersey, and New Mexico — have gone further, with statutes that define racial profiling, prohibit it explicitly, mandate anti-profiling policies and officer training, require data collection, and designate an entity to review complaints or data.12Cardozo Law Review. Bans With No Bite California’s Racial and Identity Profiling Act, enacted in 2015, is among the most detailed. It requires officers to document their perception of each detained or searched person’s age, gender identity, race, ethnicity, and disability status, with data submitted to the state Department of Justice for analysis.13UC Berkeley Police Department. Racial and Identity Profiling Act

Enforcement varies. Colorado, Connecticut, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, and South Carolina make noncompliant agencies ineligible for state grant funds. Texas requires all law enforcement agencies to submit annual racial profiling reports to the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement, with penalties for noncompliance that can include fines of $5,000 per violation and suspension or revocation of a police chief’s license.14Texas Commission on Law Enforcement. Racial Profiling Reports A 2021 investigation found that TCOLE had failed to collect required analyses from more than 250 agencies for a decade and had taken no enforcement action in five years. After the disclosure, the agency built a centralized web portal and reported full compliance from all 2,700 Texas law enforcement agencies.15Texas Association of Broadcasters. KXAN Investigation on TCOLE Compliance

Even where state bans sound strong on paper, legal analysts note significant limits. Whren allows officers to justify a stop with any observed traffic violation regardless of motive, so proving a given stop was racially motivated remains difficult. Many statutes lack clear mechanisms to hold individual officers accountable, and some departments have simply failed to collect the mandated data.

Court-Ordered Reform: Floyd and DOJ Consent Decrees

Two mechanisms have produced the most concrete reforms: private class actions that result in federal court supervision, and DOJ pattern-or-practice investigations that end in consent decrees.

Floyd v. City of New York, filed in 2008, is the leading example of the first path. After a nine-week trial, U.S. District Judge Shira Scheindlin ruled on August 12, 2013, that the NYPD was liable for a pattern and practice of unconstitutional stops that violated both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.16Center for Constitutional Rights. Floyd v. City of New York Roughly 85 percent of those stopped under the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program were Black or Latino, groups that together made up about 52 percent of the city’s population.

Judge Scheindlin ordered the appointment of a federal monitor and a community engagement process to shape reforms.17NYCLU. Federal Judge Orders Major Reforms to NYPD Stop-and-Frisk Practices The City initially appealed, withdrew the appeal in October 2014, and entered a settlement with changes to policies, training, supervision, and accountability. The monitor’s initial term was three years, after which the NYPD Inspector General would continue oversight.18Justia. Floyd v. City of New York, No. 13-3088 As of early 2026, the case remains under active judicial supervision. In September 2024, the court filed a 500-page draft report recommending changes to the NYPD’s disciplinary system.16Center for Constitutional Rights. Floyd v. City of New York

Since 1994, the Department of Justice has used pattern-or-practice investigations and consent decrees as its main tool for reforming departments found to engage in systemic misconduct, racial profiling included. Seattle entered a decree in 2012 and achieved a 60 percent reduction in serious use of force before most provisions were terminated in 2023. Newark entered a decree in 2016 after a DOJ finding of unconstitutional pedestrian stops. Albuquerque reached 99 percent compliance before its decree was lifted in 2024.19Governing. How Five Cities Have Changed Policing Under Federal Consent Decrees New Orleans entered a decree in 2013 after findings of racial profiling, unconstitutional arrests, and excessive force. Ferguson, Missouri, remains under its decree, with reform progress described as elusive.20American Bar Association. Police Reforms in Ferguson Remain Elusive

The future of this model is now uncertain. In May 2025, the DOJ under the Trump administration moved to dismiss consent decrees with Minneapolis and Louisville, retracted earlier findings of constitutional violations, and closed investigations into police departments in Phoenix, Trenton, Memphis, Mount Vernon, Oklahoma City, and the Louisiana State Police.21ABC News. Justice Department to Drop Police Reform Agreements The administration argued the decrees create excessive bureaucracy, hamper recruitment, and undermine local control. On May 27, 2025, a federal judge in Minneapolis granted the DOJ’s request to dismiss the proposed decree with prejudice, citing cost and questioning the evidence behind the original findings.22Sahan Journal. Minneapolis Federal Consent Decree Dismissed Minneapolis officials said they would pursue reforms voluntarily and continue operating under a separate consent decree with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights. In Louisville, the federal judge had not yet ruled on the DOJ’s dismissal motion by late 2025; the court declared the original consent decree motion moot and placed proceedings in abeyance.23Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse. United States v. Louisville, Case 18177

Immigration Stops After Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo

Immigration enforcement operates under different Fourth Amendment doctrine than ordinary criminal stops, and recent Supreme Court action has widened the gap. In September 2025, the Court issued a 6-3 order in Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo staying a federal district court injunction that had barred immigration agents from making stops in the Los Angeles area based on a person’s apparent race or ethnicity, use of the Spanish language, presence at bus stops or day-laborer sites, or type of work.24SCOTUSblog. Supreme Court Allows Federal Officers To More Freely Make Immigration Stops in Los Angeles The case grew out of “Operation At Large,” a federal initiative that produced nearly 2,800 immigration arrests in one month using roving patrols of armed, masked agents.25Supreme Court of the United States. Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo, No. 25A169

Justice Kavanaugh, concurring, wrote that under the “totality of the circumstances” framework from United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975), apparent ethnicity can be a “relevant factor” in immigration stops when combined with other indicators like location.26Cornell Law Institute. Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo, No. 25A169 Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, called the decision a “grave misuse of our emergency docket” and argued that the four factors agents used described “a very large category of presumably innocent” people, failing to provide the individualized suspicion the Fourth Amendment requires. She wrote: “We should not have to live in a country where the Government can seize anyone who looks Latino, speaks Spanish, and appears to work a low wage job.”27American Immigration Council. Supreme Court’s Decision on Racial Profiling in Immigration Raids

Legal scholars have criticized the ruling as effectively legitimizing ethnicity as a component of reasonable suspicion in immigration enforcement.28Stanford Law School. Whose Common Sense? Reflections on Noem v. Vazquez Perdomo For practical purposes, the usual limits on race-based stops do not apply in the same way when the stop is made by federal immigration agents.

Algorithmic Profiling and Predictive Policing

A newer form of the problem is harder to reach with existing laws. Predictive policing tools use historical crime data to forecast where crimes will occur or who is likely to offend. Because the training data reflects decades of racially disparate enforcement, the resulting algorithms tend to direct police attention disproportionately toward Black and Latino neighborhoods.

Chicago’s Strategic Subject List generated a list of individuals deemed likely to commit or become victims of violent crime, but its workings remained largely undisclosed, operating as what researchers call a “black box.”29NYU Law Review. Challenging Racist Predictive Policing Algorithms Under the Equal Protection Clause The NAACP has called on the DOJ to stop funding predictive policing systems until further audits and due process reviews are conducted, citing “mounting evidence” that these technologies do not reduce crime and worsen unequal treatment of communities of color.30NAACP. Artificial Intelligence and Predictive Policing Issue Brief

Litigants challenging these tools face steep hurdles. An equal protection claim requires attributing algorithmic decisions to a specific government actor and getting past the proprietary protections that shield how the algorithms work.

Where the Law Stands Now

If you are trying to understand what the law actually offers, the picture is uneven. The Constitution forbids race-based selective enforcement in principle, but Whren routes those claims into equal protection analysis that requires proving intent. Section 1983 and Title VI provide civil remedies, but qualified immunity and the intent requirement limit private suits. A standalone federal ban has been introduced repeatedly and has never passed. State laws range from detailed statutes with data mandates to nothing at all, and even strong statutes have been undermined by weak enforcement. Federal consent decrees produced real reforms in several cities and are now being dismissed. The Supreme Court has expanded the role of ethnicity in immigration stops. Algorithmic policing is adding a layer of bias that the current legal toolkit was not designed to address.

For an individual facing a stop they believe was racially motivated, the practical remedies that remain are a Section 1983 suit (difficult but possible, especially where a pattern can be shown), a Title VI complaint to the DOJ against an agency that receives federal funding, a state-law complaint where a specific ban applies, or participation in a class action where a pattern and practice can be proven. Each of these takes time and evidence, and none is guaranteed. The gap between what the law condemns in theory and what it reaches in practice is the throughline of this area.