Tennessee v. Garner is the 1985 U.S. Supreme Court decision that made it unconstitutional for police to shoot an unarmed, non-dangerous suspect just because that person is running away. The Court held that shooting a fleeing suspect is a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment, so it must be reasonable. Deadly force is reasonable only when the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a serious threat of death or physical injury to the officer or others.1Justia. Tennessee v Garner
The Night Edward Garner Was Shot
At about 10:45 p.m. on October 3, 1974, Memphis Police Officers Elton Hymon and Leslie Wright responded to a “prowler inside” call. A neighbor on her porch told them she had heard glass breaking next door. Wright radioed dispatch. Hymon went behind the house and heard a door slam. He saw someone run across the backyard toward a six-foot chain link fence.1Justia. Tennessee v Garner
The person at the fence was fifteen-year-old Edward Garner. Using a flashlight, Hymon could see Garner’s face and hands. He saw no weapon and was, in his own words, “reasonably sure” Garner was unarmed. He estimated the suspect at about 5’5″ to 5’7″ and seventeen or eighteen years old. Hymon shouted “police, halt” and stepped toward the fence. When Garner began climbing over, Hymon fired one shot. It struck Garner in the back of the head. He died on the operating table. Ten dollars and a purse taken from the house were found on his body.1Justia. Tennessee v Garner
Hymon had acted under Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-7-108, which authorized officers to use “all the necessary means to effect the arrest” if a suspect fled after being told of the intent to arrest. The Memphis Police Department’s policy tracked the statute: officers could use deadly force to stop any fleeing felony suspect after a verbal warning. Edward Garner’s father sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal civil rights statute that lets individuals sue government officials who violate their constitutional rights.2Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 42 US Code 1983 – Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights
The Fleeing Felon Rule Before Garner
For centuries under English common law, anyone could use deadly force to stop a fleeing felon. That rule made a grim sense in medieval England, when the handful of crimes classified as felonies all carried the death penalty. Killing a fleeing felon just accelerated a punishment the courts would have imposed anyway.
By the twentieth century, that logic had collapsed. Legislatures had created hundreds of non-violent felonies, from tax evasion to writing bad checks, none of which carried the death penalty. The old rule persisted anyway. When Garner reached the Supreme Court, roughly nineteen states had codified some version of the common law rule, and four more apparently retained it through case law. About eighteen states had already moved toward limiting deadly force to violent felonies or suspects armed with deadly weapons.1Justia. Tennessee v Garner
What the Supreme Court Decided
In a 6–3 ruling on March 27, 1985, the Court struck down the Tennessee statute. Justice Byron White wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens. The statute was unconstitutional because it authorized deadly force against any fleeing suspect regardless of whether the person posed a danger to anyone.1Justia. Tennessee v Garner
The reasoning had two steps. Apprehending a suspect by shooting him is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and it is the most intrusive kind of seizure possible. The common law once permitted killing any fleeing felon, but that rule made sense only when all felonies were capital crimes. Modern criminal law includes a wide range of non-violent felonies, and using deadly force to stop someone from escaping a property crime is out of proportion to any government interest in the arrest. Officers have a legitimate interest in preventing escape, the Court said, but that interest does not outweigh a person’s right to life when the suspect poses no physical danger.
The O’Connor Dissent
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. She argued the majority went too far in striking down longstanding common law and police practices. Burglary, in the dissent’s view, is inherently dangerous because it involves unlawful entry into a home where violent confrontation is always possible. The dissenters worried that officers making split-second decisions should not have to weigh whether a particular burglary suspect is “dangerous enough” for deadly force.1Justia. Tennessee v Garner
The Garner Standard for Deadly Force
The ruling set a specific test that remains the constitutional floor for every police department in the country. Under the Garner standard, an officer may use deadly force against a fleeing suspect only when both conditions are met.
First, the officer must have probable cause to believe the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. That belief can rest on the suspect’s actions during the encounter, such as brandishing a weapon, or on the nature of the crime already committed, such as a violent assault.1Justia. Tennessee v Garner Second, deadly force must be necessary to prevent escape. If other means of apprehension are available, shooting is not justified.
The Court added a practical requirement: where feasible, officers should give a verbal warning before using deadly force.3Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers. Use of Force – Part IV “Where feasible” acknowledges that some situations move too fast for a warning to be possible or meaningful. When time and circumstances allow, a warning gives the suspect a last chance to surrender.
Officers who use deadly force must be able to explain afterward what specific facts made them believe the suspect was dangerous at the moment they fired. “He was running” is not enough. “He was running and had just shot someone” is.
How Later Cases Fit With Garner
Four years later, in Graham v. Connor (1989), the Supreme Court extended Fourth Amendment analysis to all police uses of force, not just deadly force against fleeing suspects. Graham held that any claim of excessive force during an arrest or investigatory stop must be judged under an “objective reasonableness” standard. The test asks whether a reasonable officer facing the same facts would have used the same level of force. Courts weigh the severity of the crime, whether the suspect posed an immediate threat, and whether the suspect was resisting or trying to flee.4Justia. Graham v Connor
Graham also established the “no hindsight” rule. Courts judge an officer’s actions on what was known when force was used, not on what turned up later. The Garner facts cut the other way on that point. Officer Hymon could see Garner’s hands, saw no weapon, and was “reasonably sure” the teenager was unarmed at the moment he fired.
In Scott v. Harris (2007), the Court corrected a common misreading of Garner. A suspect argued that whenever an officer uses deadly force, the specific preconditions from Garner must be satisfied or the force is automatically unreasonable. The Court rejected that. Garner, the opinion explained, was not a “magical on/off switch” but an application of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard to one set of facts.5Justia. Scott v Harris Graham‘s objective reasonableness test governs every use-of-force case, and Garner remains binding for the specific proposition that shooting a non-dangerous fleeing suspect is unconstitutional.
What Garner Changed in Practice
The Department of Justice’s current use-of-force policy for federal law enforcement reflects and in places goes beyond the Garner standard. Federal officers may use deadly force “only when necessary,” meaning the officer must reasonably believe the suspect poses an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury. Deadly force may not be used solely to prevent the escape of a fleeing suspect. A verbal warning must be given before deadly force if it is feasible and would not increase the danger to the officer or others.6United States Department of Justice. Department of Justice Policy On Use Of Force
At the state and local level, virtually every police department in the country has written its use-of-force policy around the Garner and Graham framework. The broad fleeing felon statutes that existed in roughly half the states at the time of the decision were struck down, revised, or abandoned. Many departments impose extra restrictions beyond the constitutional minimum, such as requiring de-escalation attempts before any force, or treating deadly force as an absolute last resort. Those extra layers are policy choices, not constitutional requirements.
For families of people killed by police, Garner opened a path to accountability through § 1983 lawsuits. When an officer uses deadly force against someone who was not dangerous, the constitutional violation is clear and civil liability can follow. Individual officers often receive qualified immunity when they act in reliance on existing department policy or when the facts are ambiguous enough that a reasonable officer could have believed the force was justified. Qualified immunity, rather than the Garner standard itself, is where most civil rights cases over police shootings are decided today.