The Johnson and Johnson Scandal: Talc, Verdicts, and the Texas Two-Step

The Johnson and Johnson talc scandal refers to decades of litigation and disclosures over the company’s talc-based baby powder, which internal documents show tested positive for asbestos as far back as the late 1950s even as J&J assured regulators and consumers the product was safe. Tens of thousands of people have since sued, alleging the powder caused ovarian cancer or mesothelioma. J&J pulled the product from U.S. shelves in 2020 and from the global market by 2023, tried three times to resolve the claims through bankruptcy, and after a federal judge rejected the last attempt in March 2025, now faces the lawsuits one by one in the tort system.

What the Internal Documents Show

The paper trail starts in 1957 and 1958, when a consulting lab identified contaminants in J&J’s Italian talc as fibrous, needle-like tremolite — a form of asbestos. By 1967, internal memos confirmed tremolite in talc from the company’s Vermont mines. An April 1969 memo from J&J executive William Ashton called tremolite “bad” and recorded a company doctor’s advice to keep it to an “absolute minimum” and consult lawyers because the company could face litigation.¹

That same year, J&J launched an internal effort called “Project 101” after its lead medical doctor flagged asbestos contamination as a future disease risk.² A March 1973 memo about a potential patent for removing asbestos fibers from talc suggested keeping the research “confidential rather than allow it to be published… and thus let the whole world know.”³ A research director acknowledged the same year that “sub-trace quantities” of tremolite or actinolite in the baby powder “might be classified as asbestos fiber.”¹

Between 1972 and 1975, at least three independent labs found asbestos in J&J talc. A University of Minnesota professor identified “incontrovertible asbestos” — chrysotile — in a sample of Shower to Shower in 1972. A private lab in 1975 found asbestos fibers in five of 17 talc samples from the company’s chief source mine, with one described as containing “rather high” levels.¹ A 2003 internal email described baby powder as a “sacred cow.”

Later markups show the care taken with public wording. A 2013 edit to the “Safety & Care Commitment” web page changed a claim that the product had “always” been asbestos-free to a less definitive statement, with an editor’s note: “(we cannot say ‘always’).”¹

What J&J Told Regulators

None of the 1972–1975 lab findings were shared with the FDA. In a March 1976 letter to the agency, J&J stated that no asbestos had been detected in any samples tested between December 1972 and October 1973. A June 2018 ruling by Middlesex County Superior Court Judge Ana Viscomi found that this practice of giving the FDA favorable results while withholding unfavorable ones constituted a “misrepresentation by omission.”¹

Reuters also reported that J&J had lobbied regulators to set high thresholds for asbestos detection — as high as 1% — so that its products would pass testing, and that a J&J lab supervisor at one point described more sensitive detection methods as “too sensitive” for the company’s purposes.¹ In 1971, J&J hired mineralogist Arthur Langer to examine ovarian cancer tissue; when Langer confirmed the presence of both talc and asbestos, J&J “successfully dissuaded him from publishing these findings.”⁴

J&J has denied wrongdoing throughout. In response to the Reuters investigation, it called the report “false and misleading,” said its baby powder has been consistently found free of asbestos by independent institutions including NIOSH, the Harvard School of Public Health, and MIT, and said internal memos had been “distorted.”⁵

Why contamination was possible at all is a question of geology. Talc and asbestos minerals such as tremolite, actinolite, and chrysotile frequently occur together in the same rock formations, making complete separation difficult.¹ The Vermont ore at Hammondsville contained 10 to 20 percent fibrous talc along with tremolite and actinolite, and industry insiders understood that this “accessory asbestos could not be removed from the final product.” OSHA has regulated fibrous talc as asbestos since 1972.⁴

What the Science Says About Talc and Cancer

The link between asbestos inhalation and mesothelioma is well-established. The question of whether cosmetic talc — contaminated or not — causes ovarian cancer has been harder to settle. Large cohort studies, including data from the Nurses’ Health Study and the Women’s Health Initiative involving hundreds of thousands of women, generally have not found a statistically significant connection between genital talc use and ovarian cancer. Case-control studies, which are retrospective and more susceptible to recall bias, have found associations that plaintiffs’ attorneys have used in court.⁶

In July 2024, the International Agency for Research on Cancer, a WHO body, upgraded its classification of talc from “possibly carcinogenic to humans” (Group 2B) to “probably carcinogenic to humans” (Group 2A). The reclassification cited limited evidence of ovarian cancer in humans, sufficient evidence of cancer in animal experiments, and strong mechanistic evidence that talc exhibits characteristics of carcinogens.⁷ The classification reflects a hazard assessment — whether a substance can cause cancer under some conditions — rather than a quantification of risk at typical exposure levels.⁸ The working group acknowledged it could not fully rule out bias from asbestos contamination in the epidemiological studies it reviewed.⁹

When J&J Stopped Selling Talc Powder

J&J announced in May 2020 that it would stop selling talc-based baby powder in the United States and Canada, citing declining demand “due in large part to changes in consumer habits and fueled by misinformation around the safety of the product and a constant barrage of litigation advertising.”¹⁰ In August 2022, the company said it would phase out talc-based powder worldwide by 2023, switching entirely to cornstarch. Throughout, J&J maintained the product was safe: “We stand firmly behind the decades of independent scientific analysis by medical experts around the world that confirms talc-based Johnson’s Baby Powder is safe, does not contain asbestos, and does not cause cancer.”¹¹

The FDA had found traces of asbestos in baby powder samples in 2019, prompting J&J to voluntarily recall a single lot that October.¹² Under federal law, cosmetic products and ingredients are not subject to FDA review or approval before going to market; the agency can act when scientific data show harm but cannot require premarket testing. As of early 2026, no binding federal standard for asbestos detection in cosmetic talc products has been finalized.¹³

The Lawsuits and Major Verdicts

The first talc-related trial reached court in South Dakota in 2013. The first jury award followed in St. Louis in February 2016. By February 2019, J&J faced roughly 13,000 talc lawsuits in the United States.¹⁴ The company now faces about 67,000 lawsuits from cancer sufferers.¹⁵

Several verdicts stand out:

July 2018, St. Louis: In Ingham v. Johnson & Johnson, the first multi-plaintiff talc trial, a jury awarded 22 plaintiffs $550 million in compensatory damages and $4.14 billion in punitive damages. The total was later reduced to roughly $2 billion on appeal.¹⁴
October 2025, Los Angeles: A jury awarded $966 million — $16 million in compensatory and $950 million in punitive damages — to the family of Mae Moore, an 88-year-old California resident who died of mesothelioma in 2021. J&J’s litigation vice president, Erik Haas, called the verdict “egregious and unconstitutional” and said the company would appeal.¹⁶
December 2025, Los Angeles: A jury in a bellwether trial awarded $40 million to two women with ovarian cancer, finding J&J’s talc products were a “substantial factor” in their illness. The jury declined to award punitive damages.¹⁷
January 2026, Baltimore: A jury awarded $1.56 billion to Cherie Craft, a 59-year-old woman with mesothelioma, reported as the largest single-plaintiff verdict against the company.¹⁵

J&J has stated that it prevailed in 16 of 17 ovarian cancer cases tried over the past decade and has settled 95% of mesothelioma lawsuits filed.¹⁸ In January 2026, a retired federal judge ruled that plaintiffs’ expert witnesses would be allowed to testify in the consolidated federal product liability litigation that talc causes cancer, a ruling that could shape the remaining cases.¹⁵

The Texas Two-Step and Why It Failed

Rather than resolve the claims one by one, J&J tried to channel them into a bankruptcy settlement using a maneuver known as the “Texas Two-Step.” Under Chapter 10 of the Texas Business Organizations Code, a company can undergo a divisional merger, splitting itself into an asset-rich entity and a separate shell carrying the liabilities. The shell then files for bankruptcy, which triggers an automatic stay that halts related litigation.¹⁹

J&J tried this three times. In October 2021, it created a subsidiary called LTL Management LLC, assigned it the talc liabilities, and filed for Chapter 11. The Third Circuit dismissed the case, concluding LTL lacked good faith and was not in genuine financial distress. In April 2023, LTL filed again, this time backed by a $30 billion funding commitment; the bankruptcy judge dismissed the case in July 2023 for lack of immediate financial distress, and the Third Circuit affirmed.¹⁹ In September 2024, a new subsidiary called Red River Talc LLC filed a prepackaged Chapter 11 plan in the Southern District of Texas, claiming 83% claimant support for a $6.5 billion settlement paid out over 25 years.²⁰

On March 31, 2025, Judge Christopher Lopez of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas denied confirmation of the Red River Talc plan and dismissed the case. He found the voting process fundamentally flawed: the voting window was “unreasonably short,” law firms had cast votes without client authorization, and thousands of “no” votes had been improperly switched to “yes,” leading him to conclude “the entire vote cannot be certified.” He also ruled the proposed injunction was overbroad because it shielded more than 700 non-debtor entities and that nonconsensual third-party releases were impermissible under the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Harrington v. Purdue Pharma. On good faith, the court observed that Red River was not an operating company, with “no real company” and “no jobs to save.”²¹

J&J then announced it would abandon the bankruptcy strategy and return to the tort system, reversing roughly $7 billion from amounts it had reserved for the bankruptcy resolution.¹⁸ It characterized the talc litigation as “plaintiff-lawyer driven” and said it would pursue motions to exclude plaintiffs’ experts and disqualify lead counsel. The company spent more than $178 million on its three bankruptcy attempts.²²

Imerys Talc America, which bought the Hammondsville mine from J&J in 1989 and became its primary talc supplier, filed its own Chapter 11 case in February 2019 to deal with the litigation, staying roughly 14,000 claims against Imerys while the J&J lawsuits continued.²

The UK Case

In the United Kingdom, roughly 3,000 individuals have brought claims against J&J and its former consumer health subsidiary, Kenvue Ltd., alleging that talcum powder sold between 1965 and 2023 was contaminated with carcinogenic fibers including asbestos. The case, brought by the firm KP Law, is being heard in the U.K. High Court’s Manchester Circuit Commercial Court, with damages that lawyers estimate could exceed £1 billion, potentially the largest product liability case in British history.²³

The evidence draws on documents that have featured in U.S. litigation, including a 2008 internal J&J email stating: “The reality that talc is unsafe for use on/around babies is disturbing… I just don’t think we can continue to call it baby powder and keep it in the baby aisle.” J&J’s former director of toxicology, Dr. Steve Mann, testified in a recent U.S. trial that he had made safety claims about baby powder without reviewing test data and had received test results confirming asbestos but chose not to inform management or regulators.³ Kenvue has denied all allegations, saying its product “was compliant with any required regulatory standards, did not contain asbestos, and does not cause cancer.”²⁴ A hearing on the Group Litigation Order was scheduled for April 29–30, 2026.²⁵

Where Things Stand

With its bankruptcy strategy exhausted, J&J now faces the prospect of litigating tens of thousands of talc claims individually. Jury verdicts in 2025 and early 2026 have run from tens of millions of dollars to more than $1.5 billion. The company continues to maintain that its talc products were safe and that it will prevail on appeal. As of September 2025, J&J was also negotiating a $700 million settlement with 43 U.S. states and the District of Columbia to resolve state-level claims.¹⁵ The UK case is moving through early procedural stages with the potential to add billions more in liability. The talc scandal is one of several large legal problems J&J has weathered — the company has also faced major settlements over DePuy hip implants, Risperdal marketing, opioid liability, and product recalls — but talc remains the most consequential, both in the number of claimants and in the amount of money still at stake.

1
Reuters. Johnson & Johnson Knew for Decades That Asbestos Lurked in Its Baby Powder
2
Brown Lawyers. Johnson & Johnson and WR Grace
3
BBC. Johnson & Johnson Faces UK Lawsuit Over Talc Products
4
National Institutes of Health. Cosmetic Talc as a Risk Factor for Mesothelioma
5
Johnson & Johnson. Johnson & Johnson Responds to Recent News Coverage on Talc
6
Los Angeles Times. Talc Litigation and Scientific Evidence
7
International Agency for Research on Cancer. IARC Monographs Volume 136 – Talc and Acrylonitrile
8
Science Media Centre. Expert Reaction to IARC Monographs Evaluating the Carcinogenicity of Talc
9
Medscape. WHO Upgrades Carcinogenicity of Talc and Acrylonitrile
10
Johnson & Johnson. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Health Announces Discontinuation of Talc-Based Baby Powder in U.S. and Canada
11
BBC. Johnson & Johnson to Stop Selling Talc Baby Powder Globally
12
Johnson & Johnson. 15 New Tests From the Same Bottle of Baby Powder Previously Tested by FDA Find No Asbestos
13
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Talc
14
National Institutes of Health. Talcum Powder Litigation
15
International Ban Asbestos Secretariat. International Ban Asbestos Secretariat – United States
16
CNN. Johnson & Johnson Liable in Cancer Case
17
Law360. J&J Hit With $40M Verdict in Bellwether Talc Trial in LA
18
Johnson & Johnson. Johnson & Johnson to Return to Tort System to Defeat Meritless Talc Claims
19
Columbia Business Law Review. Texas Two-Step Bankruptcy and Mass Tort Litigation
20
CNBC. Johnson & Johnson Will Pay $6.5 Billion to Resolve Nearly All Talc Ovarian Cancer Lawsuits
21
Cadwalader. In Re Red River Talc LLC – Memorandum Decision
22
US Right to Know. Johnson & Johnson Talc Baby Powder and Asbestos
23
CBS News. Johnson & Johnson Faces UK Claim Over Asbestos in Talcum Powder
24
Kenvue. Statement on Behalf of Kenvue UK Limited on UK Talc Litigation
25
UK Judiciary. Janet Fuschillo and Others v Johnson & Johnson and Others