Police use of force in the United States is governed by the Fourth Amendment’s ban on unreasonable seizures, which the Supreme Court interpreted in Graham v. Connor to mean that an officer’s actions must be “objectively reasonable” based on what the officer knew at the moment force was used.1Justia. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) Alongside that constitutional rule, most agencies train officers on a use of force continuum that scales the response to the level of resistance. The continuum guides officers in the moment; the Fourth Amendment standard decides whether their choices hold up in court.
The Objective Reasonableness Standard
Graham v. Connor (1989) consolidated excessive force law under a single rule. Every excessive force claim arising from an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard, not the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process framework courts had sometimes used before.1Justia. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) The question is not what the officer intended, but whether a reasonable officer in the same situation would have done the same thing.
Courts weigh three factors from the Graham decision:
- The severity of the crime at issue. An armed robbery call justifies more control than a noise complaint.
- Whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others. This is usually the heaviest factor, because an imminent threat is what justifies the urgency behind physical force.
- Whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to flee.1Justia. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)
The test prohibits hindsight. Judges evaluate the encounter from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, accounting for split-second decisions made under stress with incomplete information. An officer does not have to be correct in a threat assessment, only reasonable. That gap between “right” and “reasonable” is wider than most people expect, and it is where most excessive force litigation plays out.
The Use of Force Continuum
While the constitutional standard applies after the fact, the use of force continuum tells officers how to calibrate force while an encounter is unfolding. The National Institute of Justice describes a typical six-level model, which individual agencies may adjust.2National Institute of Justice. The Use-of-Force Continuum
- Officer presence. No force is used. A uniformed officer arriving at a scene often deters conduct or calms a dispute without more.
- Verbal commands. Calm directions (“Let me see your identification”) escalate to short, authoritative commands (“Stop” or “Don’t move”) if compliance does not follow.
- Empty-hand control, soft. Grabs, holds, and joint locks guide or restrain someone without strikes.
- Empty-hand control, hard. Punches or kicks to subdue someone who is physically combative.
- Less-lethal methods. Chemical sprays, batons, or conducted energy devices to immobilize a person from a distance.
- Lethal force. Firearms or other deadly weapons, reserved for a serious threat of death or grave injury.
The continuum is not a ladder officers must climb one rung at a time. If someone pulls a knife during a traffic stop, an officer does not need to start with verbal commands and work upward. The framework is a training tool that matches response to threat and gives internal reviewers a structure for evaluating whether the chosen level of force fit the situation.2National Institute of Justice. The Use-of-Force Continuum
When Deadly Force Is Legal
The constitutional ceiling on lethal force comes from Tennessee v. Garner (1985), which struck down a state law allowing officers to shoot any fleeing felony suspect. Deadly force to prevent escape is unconstitutional unless the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.3Justia. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) The Court wrote: “It is not better that all felony suspects die than that they escape.”
Under Garner, an officer may use deadly force to prevent escape when the suspect has threatened the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe the suspect committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm. Where feasible, the officer must give a warning before firing.3Justia. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) “Feasible” acknowledges that warnings are not always possible in fast-moving encounters, while still requiring them when circumstances allow.
Chokeholds and Carotid Restraints
In September 2021, the Department of Justice classified chokeholds, which restrict breathing by compressing the throat, and carotid restraints, which restrict blood flow to the brain, as deadly force. Under that policy, federal agents and correctional officers may use these techniques only when the standard for deadly force is met, meaning the officer must reasonably believe the subject poses an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury.4Department of Justice. Chokeholds and Carotid Restraints; Knock and Announce Requirement
A 2022 executive order extended similar restrictions across all federal law enforcement agencies and added requirements for body-worn cameras, de-escalation training, and limits on no-knock entries. That executive order was rescinded in January 2025.5Congress.gov. Trump Administration Deactivates the National Law Enforcement Accountability Database Whether the DOJ’s 2021 internal chokehold policy remains in effect as a standalone measure is not fully clear from publicly available guidance. Many state and local agencies adopted their own chokehold restrictions independently, so the practical rule at street level varies by jurisdiction.
The Duty to Intervene
An officer who watches a colleague use excessive force and does nothing can face federal prosecution. Under 18 U.S.C. § 242, an officer who purposefully allows another officer to violate someone’s constitutional rights may be charged with failure to intervene.6U.S. Department of Justice. Law Enforcement Misconduct The government must show the bystander officer knew the violation was happening, had an opportunity to stop it, and chose not to act.
This charge turns up most often with supervisory officers who watch subordinates cross the line without stepping in, or who encourage excessive force without physically participating. The obligation is affirmative: officers have a duty to protect people in their custody from constitutional violations by other officers. Many agencies now embed duty-to-intervene rules in their written use-of-force policies, making failure to act a basis for internal discipline as well as criminal liability.
Suing an Officer for Excessive Force
When force crosses the line, two separate legal tracks can apply: a civil lawsuit for damages and a federal criminal prosecution. They operate under different standards, and an officer can face one, both, or neither.
Section 1983 Civil Claims
The primary tool for suing a law enforcement officer is 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows anyone whose constitutional rights were violated by a person acting under government authority to sue for damages.7Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 42 U.S. Code 1983 – Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights A Section 1983 excessive force claim requires the plaintiff to show the officer was acting in an official capacity and that the force was objectively unreasonable under Graham. Successful claims can recover compensatory damages for injuries, medical costs, and emotional harm, plus punitive damages in egregious cases.
Qualified Immunity
The biggest obstacle in a Section 1983 case is qualified immunity, a judge-made doctrine that shields government officials from civil liability unless they violated a “clearly established” constitutional right. The Supreme Court set the modern standard in Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982): officials performing discretionary functions are generally immune from damages so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established rights a reasonable person would have known about.8Justia. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)
Courts ask two questions: Did the officer’s conduct violate a constitutional right? And was that right clearly established at the time? Under Pearson v. Callahan (2009), judges can address those questions in either order and dismiss on the “clearly established” prong alone, without ever deciding whether the force was unconstitutional.9Justia. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) “Clearly established” usually requires a prior court decision with closely similar facts, not just a general principle that excessive force is wrong. A court might agree the officer acted unreasonably and still grant immunity because no prior case in that jurisdiction involved comparable circumstances. This is where most excessive force lawsuits end.
Qualified immunity does not protect officers from criminal prosecution, and it does not apply to lawsuits against municipalities, which can be sued under § 1983 for unconstitutional policies or customs. It is purely a defense for individual officers in civil damages suits.
Federal Criminal Charges
Federal criminal charges for excessive force fall under 18 U.S.C. § 242, which makes it a crime to willfully deprive someone of their constitutional rights while acting under government authority. Penalties scale with the harm:10Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 18 U.S. Code 242 – Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law
- Base offense: up to one year in prison and a fine.
- Bodily injury or a dangerous weapon involved: up to ten years.
- Death results: any term of years, life imprisonment, or the death penalty.
“Willfully” makes these cases harder to prove than civil claims. The government must show the officer deliberately intended to deprive the person of a constitutional right, not just that the officer exercised bad judgment. Successful federal prosecutions remain relatively rare compared to the volume of excessive force complaints filed each year.
The rules on this page govern police. Civilian self-defense is a separate body of state law with its own requirements of proportionality and necessity, and different states take different approaches to the duty to retreat and the castle doctrine. If your question is whether a private citizen’s use of force was legal, that analysis runs on different tracks than Graham.
National Use-of-Force Data
The FBI operates the National Use-of-Force Data Collection, which gathers reports from participating agencies on incidents where officers use force resulting in death or serious bodily injury, and any incident where an officer discharges a firearm at a person.11FBI Law Enforcement. The National Use-of-Force Data Collection Participating agencies submit monthly reports, including “zero reports” for months with no qualifying incidents.
The FBI requires 80% coverage of the national law enforcement population before publishing full data sets. As of August 2025, agencies covering 78% of officers were participating, close to the threshold but not yet past it.12FBI. FBI Releases Use-of-Force Data Update Participation is voluntary, and there is no federal penalty for agencies that decline.