Geofence data is the location information your phone generates every time it crosses an invisible boundary drawn on a digital map. Each crossing creates a record that typically includes your latitude and longitude, a timestamp accurate to the second, and an identifier tied to your device or advertising profile. That record fuels two very different industries: targeted advertising, which uses movement traces to measure where you go and what you buy, and criminal investigation, where police use “geofence warrants” to ask technology companies for a list of every device that was near a crime scene. Both uses are now in flux. The Supreme Court is expected to rule on the constitutionality of geofence warrants by mid-2026, and Google has already dismantled the centralized database that made most of those warrants possible.
How Geofence Data Gets Generated
A geofence is a software-defined perimeter on a map. When your phone’s location falls inside the perimeter, whatever system drew it records an event. In multi-story buildings, altitude data can even narrow your position to a specific floor.
Several technologies feed the system, usually working together. GPS satellites give the most familiar reading in open outdoor spaces. In dense urban areas where buildings block satellite signals, your phone falls back on Wi-Fi positioning, estimating location from the known addresses of nearby wireless routers. Cellular tower triangulation measures how long signals take to reach multiple towers and finds the overlap. For granular tracking inside stores or venues, Bluetooth beacons detect devices within a few feet of a sensor. Most smartphones cycle through these methods automatically, which is why a geofence can capture your presence in nearly any environment.
Who Collects Your Location Data and Why
The biggest collectors of geofence-style location data are not police. They are ordinary apps on your phone. Weather apps, navigation tools, coupon apps, games, and family-safety trackers routinely request location permissions and then share that access with outside companies through embedded software development kits. An SDK is a small piece of code a data broker pays to have included in an app. Once you grant the app location access, the SDK forwards your coordinates to the broker’s servers.
A second pipeline runs through the digital advertising system itself. When a website or app loads an ad, it broadcasts a “bid request” to thousands of potential advertisers in a milliseconds-long auction called real-time bidding. That bid request can include your GPS coordinates, your device’s advertising ID, your IP address, and inferred demographic details. Every company in the auction receives this information, not just the one that wins the ad slot. Data brokers have purchased location data harvested from these bid requests, assembling movement histories for hundreds of millions of people.
Advertisers use the data for “attribution,” proving that someone who saw a digital ad later walked into the advertised store. Retailers analyze foot traffic and measure how many shoppers visit competitors. Political campaigns have used it to target voters based on what rallies or churches they attend. That commercial appetite is the economic engine behind most location tracking.
Why “Anonymous” Location Data Usually Isn’t
Companies that sell location data typically strip obvious identifiers like your name or phone number before packaging the data. But location data is inherently identifying. A trace that starts at the same house every morning and ends at the same office every weekday afternoon describes exactly one person. Researchers have shown that even heavily anonymized mobility datasets can be re-linked to specific individuals by matching patterns against a small amount of outside information, like a home address or workplace. The more points in the trace, the easier the match.
The common reassurance that location data is “anonymized” or “aggregated” offers less protection than it sounds. Anyone with an anonymous movement dataset and a short list of known locations for a target can often connect the two.
Geofence Warrants and How Police Use Them
A geofence warrant inverts the normal investigative sequence. Instead of identifying a suspect and then looking for evidence, investigators start with a crime scene and ask a technology company for data on every device that was nearby. They draw a geographic boundary around the area, define a window of time, and ask a judge to approve a search of the company’s location database for all matching records.
When a judge signs the warrant, the process typically runs in three stages. First, the company searches its database and returns an anonymized list of devices found within the geofence during the specified window, along with coordinates and timestamps. Investigators review those anonymous patterns to pick out which devices look relevant. Second, law enforcement goes back and requests additional location context for a narrower subset. Third, once the strongest leads are identified, a further court order unmasks the identities tied to those accounts.1Congressional Research Service. Fourth Amendment
Judges reviewing these warrants are supposed to scrutinize the radius and the length of the time window. A warrant covering several city blocks for an entire day sweeps in far more bystanders than one covering a single building for twenty minutes. Different courts have drawn that line in different places, which is why the issue has reached the Supreme Court.
Where the Courts Stand
Carpenter v. United States
The framework starts with the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Carpenter v. United States. By a 5-4 vote, the Court held that the government’s acquisition of historical cell-site location records is a Fourth Amendment search and generally requires a warrant supported by probable cause. The opinion emphasized that cell phones track “nearly exactly the movements of their owner” and give the government “near perfect surveillance” with the ability to “travel back in time to retrace a person’s whereabouts.”2Supreme Court of the United States. Carpenter v. United States The Court declined to apply the “third-party doctrine,” reasoning that people do not truly volunteer their location to a wireless carrier just by turning on a phone. Carpenter did not address geofence warrants directly, but its reasoning set the stage for every challenge that followed.
The Fifth Circuit’s Ruling
In August 2024, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued the most forceful appellate ruling on the subject. In United States v. Smith, the court held that geofence warrants “are modern-day general warrants and are unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.”3Brookings. Supreme Court Agrees to Hear a Fourth Amendment Case Regarding Geofence Warrants A geofence warrant, the court explained, cannot establish probable cause as to every person whose data it captures; it sweeps in anyone who happened to be in the area. Even so, the court allowed the evidence to stand under the “good faith” exception. That pattern has repeated elsewhere: courts call the warrants constitutionally deficient but let the evidence in, which keeps the underlying question unresolved.
Chatrie v. United States
On January 16, 2026, the Supreme Court agreed to hear Chatrie v. United States, which asks whether the execution of a geofence warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. A Virginia federal district court had already found the warrant unconstitutional because the government lacked particularized probable cause for every Google user inside the geofence, then declined to suppress the evidence under the same good-faith exception.3Brookings. Supreme Court Agrees to Hear a Fourth Amendment Case Regarding Geofence Warrants A decision could arrive by June 2026 and would be the first Supreme Court ruling directly addressing whether geofence warrants are constitutional.
Google’s Exit Changes the Landscape
For years, Google was the primary target of geofence warrants because its Sensorvault database stored the location history of hundreds of millions of Android and Google Maps users on centralized servers. In December 2023, Google announced it would move all Timeline location data to on-device storage, cut the default auto-delete period from eighteen months to three months, and encrypt any cloud backups so that even Google cannot read them. The migration began rolling out in December 2024.
Google can no longer respond to new geofence warrants, because it no longer holds the relevant data on its servers. Apple never stored centralized location histories in the same way, so it was never a meaningful source for these warrants either. Geofence warrants are not dead: law enforcement can still direct them at other companies that collect location data, and the data broker ecosystem remains a potential target. But the single largest database behind most of these warrants is gone.
Your Rights Under Current Law
No comprehensive federal privacy law currently governs the commercial collection or sale of location data. The heaviest regulation comes from state statutes. The most influential is the California Consumer Privacy Act, which gives residents the right to request a full report of the personal data a company has collected about them, including location history, and the right to demand deletion. More than a dozen states now have comprehensive consumer privacy statutes with similar provisions, and most treat precise geolocation as a “sensitive” category requiring heightened consent.
A handful of states have gone further by directly restricting law enforcement’s use of geofence warrants. Utah passed legislation in 2023 imposing requirements on how these warrants are issued. New York enacted a law targeting geofencing technology around health care facilities and introduced a broader Reverse Location Search Prohibition Act aimed at restricting law enforcement’s use of geofence and keyword searches.
At the federal level, the Federal Trade Commission has used its authority over unfair and deceptive practices to police location data abuses. In January 2025, the FTC took action against General Motors for sharing drivers’ precise location and driving behavior data with third parties without meaningful consent.4Federal Trade Commission. FTC Takes Action Against General Motors for Sharing Drivers’ Precise Location and Driving Behavior Data Without Consent Companies that violate an FTC consent order face civil penalties of up to $53,088 per violation, adjusted for inflation annually.5Federal Trade Commission. FTC Publishes Inflation-Adjusted Civil Penalty Amounts for 2025 A single data-sharing arrangement can affect millions of users, so total exposure adds up quickly.
If you live or travel in the European Union, the General Data Protection Regulation classifies location data as personal data and requires any company processing it to have a valid legal basis. Consent is one option, but not the only one; the GDPR lists six grounds, including legitimate business interest and contractual necessity. The regulation does not contain a specific “opt-out of sale” right the way California does, but it gives individuals the right to withdraw consent at any time if consent was the basis used, and withdrawing has to be as easy as giving. Fines reach up to four percent of a company’s global annual revenue.
How to Limit Your Exposure
You cannot eliminate location tracking entirely without giving up your phone, but you can meaningfully reduce the trail you leave. The highest-impact steps target the two biggest pipelines: the apps on your phone and your operating system’s own tracking features.
On Android, you can switch any app from precise to approximate location access. Long-press the app icon, tap App Info, then Permissions, then Location. If you have allowed location access, you will see a toggle for “Use precise location.” Turning it off limits the app to roughly three square kilometers of area rather than your exact coordinates.6Android Help – Google Help. Manage Location Permissions for Apps For weather or news apps, approximate works fine. Reserve precise access for navigation apps that genuinely need it.
On iPhones and iPads, Apple stores a local log of places you visit frequently. To turn it off, go to Settings, then Privacy & Security, then Location Services, then System Services, and disable Significant Locations & Routes.7Apple Support. Manage Location Services Settings You can also review each app’s location permission under the same Location Services menu and downgrade anything that does not need constant access.
For Google accounts, Timeline data now defaults to a three-month auto-delete, after which visit and route history is erased. You can verify or shorten the window in your Google account’s Activity Controls. If you want no cloud-stored location history at all, turn Timeline off entirely.
The advertising pipeline is worth addressing separately. Both iOS and Android let you reset or disable your mobile advertising ID, which is the identifier data brokers use to track you across apps. On iPhone, go to Settings, then Privacy & Security, then Tracking, and turn off “Allow Apps to Request to Track.” On Android, go to Settings, then Privacy, then Ads, and select “Delete advertising ID.” Removing the identifier does not stop apps from collecting location, but it makes it much harder for brokers to stitch your movements into a long-term profile tied to a single identity.