What Is Merit Selection and How Does It Work for Judges?

Merit selection of judges is a hybrid process in which a nominating commission screens applicants for a judicial seat, forwards a short list of finalists to the governor, and the governor appoints one of them; after an initial period on the bench, the judge faces a yes-or-no retention election rather than running against an opponent. About 21 states and the District of Columbia use some version of this method for their highest courts, and roughly 22 states apply it to at least one lower court. Missouri adopted the first such system in 1940, which is why the approach is still often called the Missouri Plan.

Where Merit Selection Fits Among Judicial Selection Methods

States pick judges in a handful of distinct ways, and merit selection is one option among several. Partisan elections put candidates on the ballot with a party label. Nonpartisan elections drop the label but still require campaigning and fundraising. Some states let the governor appoint judges directly, sometimes with legislative confirmation. A small number use legislative election, where lawmakers vote to fill the seat.

Merit selection, sometimes called assisted appointment, sits between pure appointment and pure election. A commission narrows the field to pre-vetted finalists, the governor chooses from that list, and voters later weigh in through retention. The design is meant to keep judges from having to raise campaign money or court voters directly while still leaving the public a role. Whether it strikes that balance well is one of the longest-running debates in judicial administration.

The Judicial Nominating Commission

Everything in merit selection begins with the nominating commission. These panels take applications, run background checks, interview candidates, and decide which names go to the governor. Composition varies by state, but commissions generally mix attorneys and non-attorney members of the public.

There are three broad structural models. Bar-controlled commissions give the state bar association the power to elect a majority of members. Governor-controlled commissions let the governor appoint most of the panel. Hybrid commissions pull members from multiple sources so no single actor can dominate. The widely recommended practice is a majority of non-attorney members, with political, demographic, and geographic diversity across the panel.

Members usually serve staggered terms. That detail does more work than it looks like it does. Without staggered terms, a single governor or a single bar leadership cycle could stack the commission and effectively handpick judges while keeping the appearance of independent screening. Most commissioners serve without pay, or with modest expense reimbursement, which tends to draw people interested in civic service rather than political advancement.

How Candidates Are Screened

Applications go well beyond a résumé. Candidates submit a detailed professional history including significant cases they have handled, a financial disclosure listing assets, liabilities, gifts, and outside income, and a record of any disciplinary history with the state bar. References are required, and writing samples such as briefs or prior opinions let the commission judge analytical skill and legal reasoning directly. Incomplete applications are typically rejected without review, which makes the paperwork itself a filter.

Baseline eligibility is a separate matter. Most states require bar admission and active legal practice for a minimum number of years, with five to ten years common for trial court seats and more for appellate or supreme court positions. Candidates generally must be residents of the jurisdiction they would serve, and many states apply a mandatory retirement age.

Interviews and Deliberation

After paper review and background work, the commission interviews the strongest applicants. Interviews probe judicial philosophy, temperament, and how candidates have handled difficult professional situations. Many states open these sessions to the public or record them.

The commission then deliberates privately and votes on which candidates to forward. Missouri’s commission sends exactly three names; other states forward a different number set by their own rules. The governor must choose from the list within a set deadline. If the governor misses the deadline, appointment authority typically shifts to the chief justice of the state supreme court or reverts to the commission, so the seat does not sit empty.

This structure gives the governor real but bounded authority. The final pick is executive, but the pool has already been narrowed to candidates the commission has vetted. A governor who dislikes every finalist cannot swap in an outside favorite.

Retention Elections

After serving an initial term, the appointed judge goes on the ballot in a retention election. Voters see the judge’s name and vote yes or no on continued service. There is no opponent, no party label, and no traditional campaign.

Timing of that first retention vote varies. Some states schedule it at the first general election held more than a year after appointment; others use a three-year threshold. Subsequent retention terms also vary by court level, generally running six years for trial courts and up to ten or twelve years for state supreme court justices.

A simple majority of yes votes keeps the seat in nearly every state that uses retention. Illinois is the sole exception, requiring 60 percent. If a judge falls short, the seat becomes vacant at the end of the current term and the merit selection cycle starts over with a new call for applications.

How Often Judges Actually Lose

Incumbents almost always win. Since 1990, state supreme court justices have been retained roughly 98 percent of the time, with only nine losing their seats across that stretch. The most recent defeat came in 2024, when an Oklahoma Supreme Court justice was not retained. Critics read that record as evidence that retention is a rubber stamp. Defenders read it as evidence that the up-front screening is doing its job.

What Voters Know Before a Retention Vote

Retention elections only function as accountability if voters have real information. Seventeen states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico run formal judicial performance evaluation programs, and seven of those states deliver results directly to voters ahead of retention elections.

These evaluations typically measure four areas drawn from American Bar Association guidelines: legal ability, integrity and impartiality, communication skills, and professionalism and temperament.1American Bar Association. Black Letter Guidelines for the Evaluation of Judicial Performance Scoring draws on surveys of attorneys who have appeared before the judge, along with jurors and court staff.

In states without a formal program, voters piece together what they can from bar association statements or newspaper coverage. The gap matters: without accessible performance information, retention votes slide toward pure name recognition.

Campaign Rules for Judges on the Ballot

Judges facing retention run under stricter campaign rules than other candidates. A judge cannot personally solicit or accept campaign contributions. Fundraising, advertising, and outreach must be handled by a separate campaign committee, and the judge must instruct that committee to observe applicable contribution limits.2American Bar Association. Model Code of Judicial Conduct – Canon 5 Campaign funds cannot be used for personal benefit, and the judge is responsible for taking reasonable steps to keep supporters from engaging in prohibited conduct.

The firewall exists for a plain reason. A judge who personally asks a lawyer for money creates an implicit expectation of return from the bench. The committee structure does not eliminate that dynamic, but it puts distance between the judge and the donor.

Discipline Between Elections

Retention happens on a cycle; misconduct does not. Every state maintains a judicial conduct commission (names vary) that investigates complaints against sitting judges. The commission itself does not impose public discipline. It finds facts, reaches conclusions, and recommends a response. Public sanctions are imposed by the state’s highest court.

Available sanctions run from confidential corrective agreements and private admonitions for minor matters, through public reprimands and suspension, up to removal from the bench for conduct showing the judge is unfit to serve.3American Bar Association. Model Rules for Judicial Disciplinary Enforcement – Rule 6 Grounds for removal have historically included bribery, intoxication on the bench, sexual assault, false statements, and abuse of the contempt power.

Common Criticisms

The objections to merit selection are substantive and worth taking straight.

The most basic criticism is that the public never gets to pick from competing candidates. A commission narrows the field before voters are involved, and the retention election that follows offers no alternative name on the ballot. With a 98 percent retention rate, critics argue the voter role is nominal.

A second criticism concerns who controls the commissions. In bar-controlled systems, attorneys elected by the state bar association hold the majority. That gives lawyers, as a professional class, outsized influence over who becomes a judge, while ordinary voters have no say in choosing commissioners.

A third challenges the premise that the process is less political. The argument is that merit selection moves political maneuvering out of public campaigns and into private commission deliberations, where deal-making is harder to observe. Supporters concede that no method is apolitical and argue the real gain is reducing the role of campaign money and attack advertising on the bench.

Every selection method involves tradeoffs. Elections maximize public participation but push judges to fundraise. Direct appointment is efficient but concentrates power. Merit selection tries for a middle path and introduces its own accountability gaps. That is why judicial selection reform keeps reappearing on state legislative agendas.